Research On Supervision Game Analysis And Reward-punishment Mechanism Of Green Building Construction Process

China is in the process of rapid urbanization,and the problem of building energy consumption is particularly prominent.The implementation of green building can effectively improve China’s living environment,reduce building energy consumption and solve energy problems to a certain extent.However,with the blowout growth of green construction projects,various problems are gradually exposed in the development of green buildings in China.The quality problems existing in practice should not be ignored.While pursuing the improvement of the speed and quantity of green buildings,we should strengthen the supervision and management of the quality of green buildings.The key to grasping the quality of green buildings lies in the control of the construction process of green buildings.This link is not only important in the implementation of technology but also a key link to ensuring the realization of the design objectives of green buildings.Therefore,to promote the high-quality development of green buildings,relevant government supervision departments need to carry out strong supervision of construction enterprises and implement a series of incentive,reward and punishment policies.At the same time,due to the information asymmetry and interest asymmetry between the supervision subject and the supervision object,the subject’s cognition based on risk and value is not only an important factor affecting its behavior decision-making,but also an important reason for the failure of supervision.Based on the evolutionary game theory with bounded rationality as the premise,this paper constructs the game model between government supervision departments and construction enterprises under static and dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms and analyzes whether the dynamic reward-punishment mechanism is more effective than the static reward-punishment in encouraging the government supervision department to actively supervise and the construction enterprises to construct according to the rules.Then,on this basis,considering the psychological factors and behavior characteristics of the game subjects,the prospect theory is introduced to explain the reasons for the different behavior tendencies of the game subjects and the conditions for reaching a stable state from the perspective of risk perception,and further,explore the effects of different reward and punishment policy combinations,to provide theoretical and decision support for the healthy development of green buildings.The research shows that:(1)Under the single static reward-punishment mechanism,that is,when the rewards and punishments of government regulators for construction enterprises are set to a fixed value,the behavior evolution of both parties shows a periodic cycle mode,and there is no evolutionary stability strategy in the system.(2)Under the dynamic subsidy-punishment mechanism,regardless of the initial strategy choice of the government supervision department and the construction enterprise,the evolution track of the game system spirals around the stable equilibrium point,which overcomes the defect of the infinite vicious cycle of the strategy choice of the government and the construction enterprise under the static reward and punishment mechanism.And there is an evolutionary stability strategy in the system.(3)Only considering the limited rationality of government supervision departments and construction enterprises,it is concluded that dynamic reward and static punishment,as well as dynamic reward and dynamic punishment policies,have a better effect on improving the green construction enthusiasm of government supervision departments and construction enterprises.When considering both the bounded rationality of the game subject and the influence of psychological factors on its behavior,it is clear that the effect of dynamic reward and dynamic punishment is the best.(4)Under the dynamic reward and dynamic punishment mechanism,the probability of government supervision departments choosing active supervision is inversely proportional to the upper limit of subsidy and the loss of responsibility cost;The probability of government supervision departments choosing active supervision is positively proportional to the upper limit of punishment and the transfer coefficient of responsibility cost.(5)Under the dynamic reward and dynamic punishment mechanism,the probability of construction enterprises choosing green construction according to the design requirements is positively proportional to the upper limit of subsidy,the upper limit of punishment,the loss of responsibility cost,and the transfer coefficient of responsibility cost.