Research On The Influence Path Of Exchange Restructuring Inquiry Letter On Cross-Border M&A Information Disclosure

With the development of our capital market,many questions will be raised.As an important business behavior in the capital market,merger and acquisition usually has a complicated relationship.Due to information asymmetry and other factors,it is very easy for listed companies to disclose merger and acquisition information in an incomplete and timely manner.In order to protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors,the financial supervision means of our country is also constantly innovating.With the reform of the supervision system of the exchange which takes "information disclosure as the center",the "nonpenalty supervision" represented by the supervision system of the inquiry letter has been widely concerned by the academic and practical circles in recent years.In recent years,Chinese scholars’ research on inquiry letter has been rising,most of the research focuses on financial inquiry letter and its economic consequences.So back to the letter of inquiry itself,the direction of its supervision is the information disclosure of listed companies.At present,scholars have not paid enough attention to the specific influence path of restructuring inquiry letters on information disclosure of cross-border M&A transactions and the improvement of subsequent M&A information disclosure of listed companies.In the form of a case,this paper selects the cases of Jixiang Stock crossborder merger and acquisition receiving the restructuring inquiry letter from Shanghai Stock Exchange for analysis,and summarizes three influence paths,which are respectively "information discovery-signal transmission" path,market pressure path and external reputation pressure path.The results show that the restructuring inquiry letter has the function of information discovery,and the regulatory inquiry letter can release the regulatory pressure.The severity of the inquiry letter issued for the cross-border merger and acquisition of Jixiang shares is higher than the average level of the exchange,which releases the risk warning signal and brings negative long-term and short-term market reaction to Jixiang Shares.The restructuring inquiry letter has the effect of risk signal transmission.After receiving the letter of inquiry on restructuring,Jixiang Shares can stimulate the supervision of external stakeholders.Negative media reports and the reduction of positive emotion in investor stock discussion will have a negative impact on the company’s reputation.Under the pressure of the stock market and reputation,the company will organize the disclosure of incremental information and increase the cost of information disclosure,which can alleviate the information asymmetry to some extent.Thus,it can achieve the effect of restricting corporate behavior and improve the quality of M&A information disclosure to a certain extent.However,the supervision of inquiry letter has certain defects on the improvement of the subsequent information disclosure of the case company.In the short term,the reply letter of Jixiang Stock did not bring positive market reaction to it.Investors are not satisfied with the content of the reply letter,and Jixiang Stock still has not disclosed the merger and acquisition information in time.In the long run,the regulatory pressure of the inquiry letter failed to make Jixiang Shares continue to improve the company’s overall information disclosure,and failed to further improve the company’s information disclosure rating.Although this study is a case study,it still finds the subtle defects in the influence of restructuring inquiry letter regulation on the information disclosure of merger and acquisition transactions of case companies,which can provide some references for stock exchanges to optimize the inquiry letter regulation system,and also provide suggestions for small and medium investors,listed companies,third-party intermediaries and media to participate in capital market activities.