| With the deep exploration and development of oil and gas in China under the background of energy transformation,the overall development of oil and gas presents a trend from shallow to deep,from simple to complex,from conventional to unconventional.Shale gas,as a clean unconventional natural gas,has become a new growth point of world natural gas production and an important strategic resource for oil and gas exploration and development in the world.However,because most shale gas in China is distributed in mountainous terrain,the mining conditions are more arduous,and the development is still in the initial stage.There are still various obstacles,such as immature technology,high development cost,environmental pollution,backward infrastructure and so on,with the characteristics of high technology,high investment and high risk.Among them,the core engineering technology still needs to rely on professional engineering technology service companies to carry out engineering development and capacity construction.However,in the process of engineering technology service,it is easy to cause the principal-agent problem of "moral hazard" between shale gas developers and contractors due to communication barriers and information asymmetry.In view of this problem,this paper applies the information economics to the field of shale gas exploration and development,and provides a reference for the owners to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to solve the principal-agent problem with the contractor.From the perspective of shale gas developers,this paper first analyzes the relevant theories and the current situation of shale gas contracting market.This paper expounds the causes and manifestations of the principal-agent problem between shale gas developers and contractors,analyzes the defects of the existing methods and mechanisms in the process of solving the principal-agent problem,and puts forward that reasonable incentive mechanism should be designed.At the same time,it introduces the current situation and development mode of shale gas engineering technology service market,and analyzes the existing contract types and incentive mechanism The analysis of incentive measures shows that this paper will use the cost plus incentive fee contract as the carrier of incentive contract.Secondly,it analyzes the game behavior between shale gas developers and contractors,studies the behavior selection and influencing factors of both sides under the incentive mechanism of shale gas development performance stage.It provides the corresponding research basis for the following research and mechanism design.Thirdly,this paper studies the design of explicit incentive mechanism to improve the effect of shale gas exploration and development under short-term cooperation.Considering the engineering characteristics,enterprise characteristics and using the key factors extracted from the game analysis as the incentive factors into the model,the dominant incentive mechanism model based on multi task to improve the shale gas exploration and development effect is constructed.Through the result analysis,the dominant incentive mechanism method combining subjective and objective performance evaluation is finally obtained.Finally,the design of implicit incentive mechanism for shale gas exploration and development contracting under long-term cooperation is studied.The reputation incentive factor under the long-term cooperative relationship is introduced.Assuming that the owner and the contractor sign a long-term contract,which belongs to a multi-stage dynamic game cooperative relationship,the incentive model of the owner to the contractor is constructed in two stages.Through the analysis of the calculation results of the model,it is found that the contract with long-term reputation incentive mechanism is better than the contract without long-term reputation incentive mechanism.And the incentive framework of shale gas developers to contractors is designed to provide some reference for the development enterprises. |
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