Study On The Development Mode Of Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance In China

With the rapid economic and social development,China faces severe environmental pollution risks,so green finance has become one of the hot topics attracting much attention.In order to establish a long-term mechanism for environmental risk management,environmental pollution liability insurance(referred to as "environmental liability insurance")has started the pilot work.Environmental pollution liability insurance can ensure that the third party victims receive compensation in time,reduce the pressure on enterprises to pay,and share the cost of environmental governance with the government,so as to achieve a win-win situation for all parties.Since the implementation of "environmental liability insurance" in 1991,the government has issued a series of supporting policies and programs for more than 30 years,and the pilot work in various regions has also achieved certain results.But on the whole,China’s environmental pollution liability insurance is still facing the "double cold" situation,which is caused by the inactive enterprises and the low underwriting willingness of insurance companies.There are many reasons for this situation,but the most critical one is the unclear operation mode of "environmental liability insurance" in China.Therefore,this paper analyzes the problems existing in the current "environmental liability insurance" mode in China and studies the development mode suitable for China’s "environmental liability insurance",so as to effectively promote the healthy development of China’s "environmental liability insurance".The purpose of this paper is to analyze the problems existing in the current operation mode of environmental pollution liability insurance in China,build a game model among the participants,select the operation mode suitable for China’s environmental liability insurance from the perspective of the government,and put forward relevant suggestions.Firstly,this paper reviews the relevant literature at home and abroad,summarizes the definition and characteristics of environmental pollution liability insurance,summarizes the two development modes of environmental liability insurance and their similarities and differences,and studies the relevant theories and game theory of environmental liability insurance.Then,the paper discusses the operation mode of "environmental liability insurance" in three representative regions,and analyzes the problems existing in the current operation mode of China,such as imperfect legal system,inadequate accountability,low enthusiasm of participants,unreasonable product design and lack of professional evaluation mechanism.Secondly,by introducing the game theory analysis method,the static game models with complete information and dynamic game models with incomplete information are successively established to explore the game strategies among the three parties involved in " environmental liability insurance",namely government,enterprises and insurance companies,providing model basis for the selection of operation mode.Then,based on the results of the model analysis and the government’s optimal action strategy,the conclusion is drawn that China’s "environmental liability insurance" should adopt the operation mode of "compulsory first,voluntary second",and the selection and operation of this mode are deeply analyzed and discussed.Finally,the paper puts forward the safeguard measures of the operation mode from five aspects: legal system,supervision,insurance enterprises and underwriting companies,and technical support.