Research On The Governance Performance Of Non-state-owned Shareholders In The Mixed Ownership Reform Of China Gold

Mixed-ownership reform is one of the important ways to achieve the goal of maintaining and increasing the assets of state-owned enterprises.With the establishment of the strategic position of mixed ownership reform,the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in our country has formally entered the mixed stage of "mechanism",a series of plans such as "double hundred action" and "two kinds of companies" are issued,marking the deepening and accelerating of the new cycle of mixed ownership reform.Although State-owned enterprises have completed mixed ownership in the shareholder structure,there are still problems such as "mixed but not unified","mixed but not reformed" and "unified but not strong".The main reasons are as follows: first,the capital of different ownership has not been deeply integrated,and the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders has not been effectively played;Second,it is difficult to achieve synergy at the micro level of capital with different attributes;Third,due to fears of loss of control and discourse power after equity participation,the willingness of non-state shareholders to participate in mixed State-owned reform is not strong.China Gold,the case study selected in this thesis,is the first company to undergo a board meeting since 2017 among the second batch of mixed reform pilot units.During the mixed reform of China Gold,non-state shareholders played a positive role in management and introduced advanced management models and rich market experience,accelerating the process of mixed reform of China Gold.Therefore,it is very important to focus on the analysis of the management mechanism,influence relationship and management performance of the non-state shareholders that China Gold has implemented in the mixed reform.This thesis firstly summarizes domestic and foreign literature on the motivation,path and performance of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in the governance of state-owned enterprises.Secondly,it briefly introduces the concept and classification of non-state-owned shareholders and the significance of participating in the mixed reform,and makes an in-depth analysis of the four motivations of introducing non-state-owned shareholders into state-owned enterprises and the governance performance of non-state-owned shareholders participating in the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,and then puts forward four main theories related to the governance of non-state-owned shareholders.Using the case analysis method,this thesis first introduces the background of China Gold and non-state shareholders introduced,and then makes a detailed review of the motivation,process and governance path of the non-state shareholders.In terms of capital management,non-state shareholders participate in the equity to achieve decentralization control.In addition,multiple property rights can create active property alliances to achieve discretionary management.In terms of governance structure and mechanism,non-state shareholders strengthen the vertical supervision of enterprises,participate in the formulation of market-oriented assessment mechanism to improve the enthusiasm of employees,as well in important decisions such as the general meeting of shareholders and the remuneration committee increases the level of dividends,thereby reducing agency costs.In terms of strategic alignment,JD promotes digital transformation strategy and accelerates business innovation and upgrading;Institutional investors help build a large financial strategy system to create conditions for the listing of China Gold;Industrial investors promote brand building strategy and consolidate the traditional main business of China Gold.Through the channels mentioned above,the management of non-state shareholders has effectively improved the operating efficiency,profitability and sustainable development potential of China Gold.Based on the previous analysis,this thesis draws four important conclusions.First,non-state shareholder governance can achieve checks and balances in the governance structure and improve corporate governance capabilities efficiency;Second,the governance of non-state shareholders can revitalize the utilization rate of state-owned assets and improve the operating efficiency of enterprises;Third,the management of non-state shareholders realized the diversification of business strategies and improved the company’s profitability;Fourthly,the non-state shareholder management realized the market of managerial concepts and endowed the company with self-sufficiency.Finally,the thesis makes four recommendations: we should improve the non-state capital entry mechanism,accelerate the formation of effective checks and balances of corporate governance structure;Protect the non-state-owned shareholders’ right to participate in enterprise governance and improve their control and voice;Non-state shareholders with market initiative should be introduced to enhance the strategic decision-making ability of enterprises;Attention should be paid to the self-viability of state-owned enterprises after mixed reform.We hope that by studying this case,it can provide reference for further implementation of the governance effect of non-state shareholders and accelerate the blending of the "mechanism" of mixed ownership reform.