Research On Decision Model And Contract Optimization Of Low-carbon Supply Chain Carbon Emission Transfer Based On Overconfidence

Addressing global climate change is a major challenge facing mankind in the21 st century.In order to reduce carbon emissions,governments of various countries have introduced a large number of carbon regulation policies successively,which have brought severe tests to supply chain enterprises under carbon constraints.As one of the low-carbon supply chain operation strategies,carbon emission transfer can be regarded as a means to help supply chain enterprises achieve carbon emission reduction targets.Carbon emission transfer is a low-carbon supply chain operation strategy that can help supply chain enterprises achieve carbon emission reduction goals.In addition,most economic activities and experiments show that decision makers are not absolutely rational in the decision-making process,and they tend to overestimate their knowledge reserves and judgment ability,that is,overconfidence.Overconfidence is an irrational behavior,which is usually considered a significant factor for supply chain enterprises to consider when making decisions.In summary,in the carbon regulation environment,analyzing the influence of overconfidence and carbon emission transfer on supply chain operation decision-making and coordinating them can help optimize carbon emission transfer behavior and improve the operation efficiency of low-carbon supply chain enterprises.Consequently,this thesis introduces overconfident behavior into the lowcarbon supply chain,and studies the operation decision-making and contract coordination of the supply chain under three scenarios: the supplier and the manufacturer are completely rational,the supplier is rational but the manufacturer is overconfident,and the manufacturer is rational but the supplier is overconfident.Firstly,this thesis reviews the literature in the fields of supply chain carbon emission transfer,supply chain irrational behavior and supply chain coordination contract,and explores the necessity of this research.Secondly,based on the existing relevant research,this thesis constructs a rational supply chain carbon emission transfer decision-making model,analyzes the unreasonable carbon emission transfer scope,and optimizes the unreasonable carbon emission transfer through cost sharing contract and Nash bargaining model.Thirdly,on the basis of rational situation,this thesis successively constructs the supply chain carbon emission transfer decisionmaking model under manufacturer’s overconfidence and supplier’s overconfidence,further explores the influence of overconfidence on the model and some related parameters of this thesis,and takes manufacturer’s overconfidence as an example to optimize the contract of the supply chain.Finally,through research and analysis,this thesis mainly draws the following conclusions:(1)The optimal emission reduction per unit product of the supply chain will show a certain rule with the change of carbon emission transfer.When carbon emission transfer occurs in the supply chain,the optimal carbon emission reduction per unit product increases with the increase of carbon emission transfer.The manufacturer’s profit increases with the increase of carbon emission transfer,and the supplier’s profit changes with the carbon emission transfer is related to the size of the reduction cost coefficient of the supplier to undertake carbon emission transfer.(2)The overconfidence of supply chain members has an impact on supply chain decisions.When the manufacturer is overconfident,both the optimal emissions reduction per unit of product and the supplier’s profit decrease with the increase of the manufacturer’s overconfidence level,but the impact of the manufacturer’s overconfidence level on the manufacturer’s profit is related to the amount of carbon emission transfer.When the supplier is overconfident,the optimal unit product emission reduction increases with the increase of the supplier’s overconfidence level.The profit level of the manufacturer changes inversely with the supplier’s overconfidence level,and the change trend of the supplier’s profit level with its overconfidence level depends on the level of carbon emission transfer.(3)When the emission reduction cost coefficient of suppliers to undertake carbon emission transfer meets certain conditions,there is an unreasonable carbon emission transfer range in the supply chain,and the manufacturer’s overconfidence level will affect the size of the range.By designing the cost sharing contract,the unreasonable carbon emission transfer in the supply chain can be optimized,and the Nash bargaining model can be used to determine the optimal cost sharing rate.