Game Analysis Of Financial Fraud Supervision Of Listed Companies Under The New Securities Law

In recent years,with the continuous development of the securities market,the fraudulent financial reports of listed companies in China are frequently reported in newspapers.It attacks our "body"-market economy like Omicron virus.If it is allowed to spread wantonly and is not contained and eliminated in time,it will become an important obstacle to the healthy development of the capital market.In order to effectively supervise financial fraud,China has revised the relevant laws and regulations.The promulgation of the new Securities Law shows the determination of the securities regulatory agency(hereinafter referred to as the "securities regulatory agency")to crack down on corporate fraud.In view of this,it is self-evident to study the supervision of financial fraud under the new Securities Law and put forward effective prevention measures.This paper focuses on the analysis of system background,the construction of supervision game model,the case study of financial fraud and the discussion of prevention and control countermeasures.First of all,it reviews the domestic and foreign literatures from four dimensions: financial fraud means,financial fraud supervision,financial fraud supervision game and financial fraud supervision governance,and determines the writing ideas and framework on this basis.Secondly,it introduces the theoretical basis and analyzes the background and regulatory characteristics of the new securities law.Then,from the perspective of static game with incomplete information,this paper constructs a game model of financial fraud supervision under the new and old securities laws,and obtains the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution of each game subject,and then analyzes the influencing factors and changing paths of the equilibrium solution.Then,combined with the real data of Kangmei Pharmaceutical and Guangdong Rongtai,the behavior and expected income of all game participants are deeply studied,and the conclusion is drawn that the probability of securities regulatory agencies acting and the probability of enterprises cheating can reach an ideal equilibrium state by changing the influencing factors.Finally,according to the conclusion of game analysis,combined with the relevant provisions of the new securities law,the specific countermeasures to prevent fraud are formulated from four implementation paths: reducing the income of fraud,increasing the punishment for fraud,increasing the punishment for inaction and reducing the cost of action,in order to effectively control the financial fraud of listed companies and promote the good operation of China’s economy.