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Research On The Implementation Effect And Risk Control Of China Aluminum Corporation’s Debt-to-Equity Swap

Posted on:2023-05-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F DingFull Text:PDF
GTID:2531306788959629Subject:accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
From the practice of debt-to-equity swap in China,the original meaning of debt-to-equity swap is that the state purchases the bad assets of commercial banks,which makes the creditor’s rights relationship between banks and enterprises become the equity relationship between asset management enterprises and enterprises.At the end of the 20 th century,when the economic growth rate declined,the debt ratio of entity enterprises was too high,and the reform and development faced difficulties,China began to explore the practice of debt-to-equity swap.However,the debt-to-equity swap in this period is a debt-to-equity swap under the leadership of the government,which has achieved great results in solving the bad assets of banks,optimizing the asset-liability structure of enterprises,and helping state-owned enterprises to overcome difficulties.However,with the economic development,especially after the international financial crisis in 2008,China’s economic development is faced with a series of new problems such as overcapacity,and the losses of entity enterprises have increased substantially.Under this circumstance,in2016,China put forward the market-oriented debt-to-equity swap,which enriched the connotation of debt-to-equity swap.With the introduction of corresponding policies,it has promoted the development of market-oriented debt-to-equity swap.In order to quickly get out of the predicament and get rid of the pressure of huge losses,China Aluminum Corporation(hereinafter referred to as Chinalco)carried out the practice of market-oriented debt-to-equity swap in 2017,and it has been more than five years since then.What is the implementation effect? What problems still exist in practice?What is the reference significance for other enterprises? These problems need to be summarized and analyzed theoretically,so that the experience of market-oriented debt-to-equity swap of Chinalco can provide reference for the practice of other enterprises,and at the same time,it can provide a certain basis for relevant state departments to formulate relevant policies of market-oriented debt-to-equity swap.On the basis of combing the relevant literature at home and abroad,this paper studies the implementation effect and risk control of debt-to-equity swap in Chinalco on the basis of trade-off theory,principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory.Combining with the industry characteristics and operating conditions of Chinalco,this paper analyzes the motivation and implementation scheme of the market-oriented debt-to-equity swap of Chinalco,and comprehensively analyzes the effects before and after the implementation of the market-oriented debt-to-equity swap of Chinalco by using financial index analysis,EVA analysis,horizontal comparison analysis based on radar chart and market reaction analysis based on event research,etc.,and draws the main conclusions: the model design of the market-oriented debt-to-equity swap of Chinalco is relatively scientific,which is in line with China’s national conditions;After the implementation of debt-to-equity swap,the positive financial indicators have been significantly improved,the asset-liability level and financial risks of enterprises have been reduced,and the development ability of enterprises has been effectively improved.The short-term positive effect on enterprises is obvious,but the long-term positive effect needs further observation.Investors’ attitude towards the implementation of debt-to-equity swap is not very optimistic,and the exit mechanism is not perfect.Enterprises still have internal governance risks,operational risks,excessive re-borrowing risks,equity exit risks and other risk factors.Through the analysis,some suggestions are put forward to further improve the performance management level of Chinalco,effectively prevent the potential risks of market-oriented debt-to-equity swaps and strengthen risk control.
Keywords/Search Tags:Chinalco, market-oriented debt-to-equity swap, financial performance, implementation effect, risk control
PDF Full Text Request
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