Research On The Evolutionary Game Of Outgoing Audit Of Natural Resource Assets In W Count

The construction of ecological civilization is crucial to sustainable development,and also an important part of the socialist modernization drive,affecting the country’s millennium plan.Therefore,under the premise of accurately grasping the historical trend,the Party and the state put forward the "Five in One" all-round development strategy in order to better achieve high-quality economic development and promote economic transformation and upgrading,which has given high strategic significance.In keeping with the outstanding achievements in history,the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed to "establish and improve the economic system of green and low-carbon circular development",firm the pace at this time,and the 20 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China further proposed that "Chinese path to modernization is the modernization of harmonious coexistence between man and nature".It can be seen that the construction of ecological civilization is still the focus of China’s current economic development and social governance.The natural resource asset retirement audit system was formally born out of this development concept.With the advance of the pilot work in the early stage and the subsequent nationwide promotion,this system has also achieved good results in the field of ecological civilization construction.However,some problems have also been exposed in the practice process.In order to better implement the leading cadres’ concept of green political achievements,escort the construction of ecological civilization,and deepen the implementation of this system at the grass-roots level,It is of profound significance to find hidden dangers and risks and put forward suggestions for improvement.Different from the progressiveness of the mode,the sufficiency of resources,and the clarity of responsibilities for the management and development of natural resource assets at the provincial and municipal levels,as the end of the implementation of policies in the field of ecological environment,grass-roots governments and relevant functional departments are the most direct and weak links in the implementation link.At present,the theoretical and practical circles in China focus on the former,while the grass-roots level has the most serious problems and the most complex practical solutions.In the field of natural resources assets leaving office audit,how to achieve efficiency improvement and experience accumulation is crucial.Therefore,this thesis has sorted out and analyzed the environmental audit,natural resource asset departure audit and reputation by combing the domestic and foreign literature,and analyzed the role of reputation in the audit system using the evolutionary game model.Among them,W County carried out this audit,applying the most widely adopted economic responsibility expansion audit mode,and its grass-roots audit institutions and the current situation of natural resource asset management also represent the current situation of most grass-roots units in China to a certain extent.Taking the county as the case study object,this thesis briefly describes the basic situation of the county,the audit process and the audit results,and from the perspective of reputation,constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of government-audit-public.After considering avoiding the pseudo-cooperation equilibrium and repeated game limitations of the traditional game model on reputation,This thesis analyzes the strategic probability of multiple actors in the presence and absence of reputation mechanism,and combs the feedback process of reputation signals in reducing the "political rent-seeking" behavior of departing cadres in the implementation of management functions and the implementation of central government policies according to the problems in the process of carrying out the natural resource asset audit activities of leading cadres in W County,The income matrix shall be established for the multi-party responsible subjects involved in the audit activity and the behavior strategies of each party shall be analyzed in depth.Because evolutionary game theory explains the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior.The use of natural resource assets meets the two characteristics of non-competitiveness and non-exclusiveness in the use of public goods.The establishment of rules to promote cooperation will be an important way to improve the efficiency of the natural resource assets leaving audit system.Reputation mechanism can be seen as an informal system that restricts the implementation of the behavior of reputation subjects through contracts,The effective connection between reputation mechanism and audit results will have a strong binding effect on promoting cooperation.After judging the effectiveness of reputation signals,put forward a series of policy recommendations on how to effectively combine the reputation mechanism with the application of audit results,and then put forward policy recommendations on how to improve the reputation risk weaknesses and how to build an effective reputation mechanism in combination with the case object,that is,strengthen the construction of laws and regulations,build a data platform,optimize the evaluation system,and promote the implementation of the model We should strengthen social linkage to meet the actual needs,optimize the allocation of resources to improve the efficiency of implementation,and improve the system of responsibility determination and accountability.