Research On Optimization Of Reverse Factoring Financing Decisions Based On Evolutionary Game

As the most active subject in the market,MSMEs are the mainstay of the development of the real economy and play an important role in the stable development of the national economy.However,due to their small scale and low profitability,MSMEs often have difficulties in meeting the lending standards of banks due to their own low credit levels,and have long faced the problem of difficult and expensive financing.Due to their subordinate position in the supply chain,MSME suppliers usually have cash gap periods due to the due date of accounts payable being earlier than that of accounts receivable,and it has become a new trend to use supply chain finance tools to solve the financing problems of MSMEs.Based on the joint drive of national policy and enterprise demand,the use of accounts receivable financing to ease the financing constraints of MSMEs and the development of the real economy has received widespread attention from all walks of life.Commercial factoring has become a very important force in serving MSMEs and the real economy in China,and the credit base of reverse factoring comes from the management and credit strength of the core enterprises in the supply chain,which has a broader application prospect.However,the development of reverse factoring is still relatively slow,and there is still room for the financing needs of MSMEs to be met.Therefore,it is of theoretical and practical significance to study the process of reverse factoring from the perspective of the financial supply chain,explore the evolutionary laws of the main participants and how to promote the expansion of reverse factoring,and the relevant findings can enrich and improve the application of evolutionary games and the study of reverse factoring financing,and provide theoretical references to improve the financial constraints of suppliers,enhance the market competitiveness of banks and promote the take-off of the real economy.Based on the relevant literature and theoretical knowledge at home and abroad,this thesis takes reverse factoring financing as the research object.Firstly,a static game model of banks and suppliers is constructed to explore the static equilibrium of reverse factoring financing.The factoring surplus is defined as the excess profit in the financial supply chain,and the optimization of the financial supply chain decision based on maximizing the factoring surplus is explored.Secondly,the evolutionary game model is constructed with the bank group and the supplier group as the game objects,and the equilibrium evolutionary stabilization strategies and key influencing factors of the bank and the supplier are explored.Finally,numerical simulations are used to explore the operational mechanism of the reverse factoring financing decision and to solve for the range of reverse factoring interest rates and financing ratios that ensure the system converges to the equilibrium of the reverse factoring strategy and the optimal solution based on the fastest convergence.Based on the results of the game model and numerical analysis,recommendations are made for the government to improve relevant laws,regulations and regulatory systems,for commercial banks to strengthen risk identification,and for suppliers to enhance the knowledge of their leadership.The main findings of this thesis are:(1)There is an optimal financing ratio that maximizes the factoring surplus and maximizes the excess profit of the financial supply chain.Based on the supply chain perspective to study the overall profit of the supply chain,this will help the financial supply chain to make optimal decisions.(2)The results of the evolutionary game between banks and suppliers show the existence of two evolutionary stabilization strategies(reverse factored loans,reverse factored financing)and(no reverse factored loans,no reverse factored financing).This demonstrates the evolutionary pattern and operating mechanism of banks and suppliers in the process of reverse factoring.(3)There exist optimal reverse factoring rates and financing ratios that allow the system to converge to the reverse factoring strategy equilibrium the fastest.The range of reverse factoring rates and financing ratios that ensure the convergence of the system and the numerical solution for the fastest convergence are given.The results of the fastest convergence show that when the solvency of the core firm is large,the bank gives advances based on the minimum solvency value and the bank does not need to take the risk;when the solvency is small,the bank gives advances based on a value greater than the minimum solvency value and the bank takes some risk.This will provide theoretical basis and practical inspiration to promote the rapid expansion of reverse factoring.(4)Government support,including requiring banks to participate and subsidizing suppliers to participate,and guiding the development of optimal reverse factoring rates and financing ratios,will be extremely beneficial to the development of reverse factoring.Risk aversion is an important reference factor for banks’ reverse factoring financing decisions.New influencing factors are proposed to provide a new research perspective to promote the reverse factoring financing model.