Research On The Phenomenon Of "Pseudo-market Value Management" Of Listed Companies In China

"Market value management" refers to the comprehensive use of a variety of scientific and compliant value management methods by listed companies based on their market value signals to achieve the goal of maximizing the company’s market value.Good market value management can play a role in ensuring the appreciation of investors’ assets,improving corporate operating performance and promoting the healthy development of the capital market.However,in practice,in recent years,there has been a "pseudo-market value management" in which the actual profit is improperly profited in the name of "market value management" : first manipulate the timing and content of information disclosure to promote the stock price of the target company,and then choose the right time to realize the shares held to make a profit.The basic model of "pseudo-market value management" is "manipulation of information disclosure + late realization".Among them,"information disclosure" can be divided into mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure,the latter of which is for listed companies to decide whether to disclose,when and what to disclose,thus leaving room for inducing small investors to use information disclosure;"Late-stage realization" can be divided into two ways: share reduction and equity pledge loan,and the reduction method has advantages such as non-debt repayment pressure compared with the pledge method,and in reality,the reduction of holdings has gradually become the main way for major shareholders to realize in recent years.Therefore,the research theme of this paper is "manipulation of information disclosure + late reduction and realization" type of pseudo-market value management.This paper selects the quarterly data of major shareholders’ performance forecasts and holdings reduction from 2017 to 2021,investigates the correlation between the nature,exaggeration and error of performance forecasts in the long and short term and the reduction of major shareholders through logistic and multiple linear regression,and further studies the inhibitory effect of corporate governance on illegal reduction of holdings on this basis.Full-sample regression yields the following three conclusions:a)The long-term and short-term reduction of holdings by major shareholders is significantly and positively correlated with the nature of the performance forecast of listed companies.Listed companies voluntarily disclose good news before major shareholders reduce their holdings,which indicates that the nature of information disclosure is manipulated.b)Other things being equal,the long-term reduction of the majority shareholder’s shareholding is significantly positively correlated with the exaggeration of the performance forecast,indicating that the majority shareholder will exaggerate the current performance before planning the long-term reduction,making the performance forecast more optimistic.c)Under other conditions being equal,the short-term reduction of holdings by major shareholders is significantly negatively correlated with the error of the performance forecast,indicating that the majority shareholders will reduce the error of the performance forecast before planning the short-term reduction,guide investors to make accurate forecasts,and promote the stock price to rise.In the grouping regression by ownership type,the above conclusion that the three correlations mentioned in abc are not significant for the state-owned group and significant for the non-state-owned group,while the grouping according to whether or not to sell short and the group regression according to the high and low shareholding ratio of the institution also obtained the same results,indicating that the nature of the enterprise,the short selling mechanism or the high proportion of institutional shareholding can effectively inhibit the "pseudo-market value management" of the enterprise.To this end,regulators must strengthen the supervision of information disclosure and share reduction,and improve the performance forecast disclosure system;Appropriately relax the access restrictions for securities lending,and encourage institutions to increase their holdings of shares in listed companies.Individual investors need to carefully identify the quality of actively disclosed information and establish a valuation model with complete indicators;Actively participate in the daily supervision of the company and strive to protect its own rights and interests.Listed companies must strictly regulate performance disclosure and maintain the inertia of issuing performance forecasts;Establish an effective internal supervision mechanism and actively carry out the construction of market mechanisms.The innovation of this paper is: First,the innovation of research perspective.In order to straighten out the internal logic of pseudo-market value management of "manipulating information disclosure + late reduction and realization",this paper examines whether the reduction affects the nature and accuracy of information disclosure from the perspective of major shareholders’ reduction,and tests heterogeneity through group regression in the future.Second,the expansion of research ideas.Previous studies have mainly focused on case studies,and the empirical evidence of the reduction has focused on short-term reduction.The overall idea of this paper ranges from problem discovery to empirical research to corresponding measures.In the regression,the impact of long-term reduction on information disclosure is studied,and combined with short-term reduction,it is more convincing than simple short-term reduction.