Existence And Generic Stability Of Weakly Nash Equilibria Of Generalized Set Payoffs Games

In reality,players,strategies are often influenced by strategies chosen by other players.Therefore,weakly Nash equilibrium of generalized set payoffs games is significant.In this thesis,we introduce the concept on weakly Nash equilibrium of generalized set payoffs games.The main research work includes the following aspects:1.In the sense of weakly efficient solution of vector optimization,a semicontinuous result of set optimal value function is obtained;2.By using the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem and the semicontinuity result,under the regular assumption,the existence theorem of weakly Nash equilibria of generalized set payoffs games is obtained;3.In the sense of Hausdorff metric,when the payoff function and feasible constraint set-valued mapping are perturbed,the stability of weakly Nash equilibria of generalized set payoffs games is obtained.