Tournament Incentive,Mediaattention And Stock Price Collapse Risk

A healthy and orderly capital market helps to guide the rational allocation of social resources and plays an important role in promoting a country's economic growth.However,due to the short establishment time of China's stock market and the imperfect market mechanism,individual stock crashes occur occasionally.The stock price crash not only seriously damages the interests of investors and hinders the stable operation of the capital market,but also restricts the healthy development of the real economy.Therefore,how to prevent and mitigate the risk of stock price collapse has attracted extensive attention of scholars at home and abroad.The existing literature mainly explores the influencing factors and preventive measures of stock price collapse risk from the aspects of executive over investment,earnings management,analyst attention and audit supervision.Few scholars explore the impact mechanism and effect of executive industry salary gap and executive regional salary gap on stock price collapse risk from the perspective of tournament incentive.In the capital market,as a third party independent of enterprises and investors,the media enjoys a higher degree of public trust.It affects the behavior of investors through the functions of supervision,information dissemination and public opinion shaping.So,what kind of role the media plays between the championship incentive and the risk of the company's share price collapse is a problem worthy of research and consideration.Based on this,this paper empirically investigates the impact mechanism of tournament incentive on the risk of stock price collapse,and the regulatory effect of media attention on the relationship between them,which provides a certain theoretical basis and empirical evidence for reducing the risk of stock price collapse.Taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from2010 to 2020 as the research object,based on reputation theory,information asymmetry theory and tournament theory,this paper studies the impact effect between tournament incentive,media attention and stock price collapse risk,and verifies the robustness of the research conclusion by using the methods of propensity score matching(PSM)and substitution variables.The study found that:(1)the stronger the incentive of industry and regional Championships,the higher the risk of stock price collapse;(2)The higher the media attention,the lower the risk of stock price collapse.Among them,positive reports can alleviate the risk of stock price collapse,and negative reports will aggravate the risk of stock price collapse;(3)The higher the media attention,the weaker the aggravating effect of tournament incentive on the risk of stock price collapse;(4)Further analysis shows that tournament incentive aggravates the risk of stock price collapse by improving management earnings management;The negative regulatory effect of media attention on Tournament incentive and stock price collapse risk is more significant in the samples with high market competition,dispersed equity and low level of rule of law.The research conclusion of this paper has important theoretical and practical significance for enterprises to reasonably design executive compensation and prevent the risk of stock price collapse.