Analysis And Design Of Incentive-compatible Rational And Secure Computing Protocols

In the rational computing protocols such as rational secret sharing and rational delegation computing,rational participants often fall into the prisoner's dilemma.What's more,how to break the prisoner's dilemma and achieve incentive compatibility is a challenging problem,which is also the problem to be studied in this paper.More specifically,combining game theory and mechanism design,this paper studies rational secret sharing and rational delegation computing.The specific research work is as follows:(1)An incentive-compatible rational secret sharing scheme is proposed.Firstly,a game tree of rational secret sharing in the natural state is constructed,and the sequential equilibrium is solved,where no rational participant is able to correctly reconstruct the secrets.Secondly,the rational secret sharing process using cryptographic methods is redesigned,and a novel rational secret sharing system model with incentive mechanism is designed.Furthermore,the game tree under the model is constructed,and the sequential equilibrium of the game is found,which means that no rational participants will deviate from honest behavior,thus solving the prisoner's dilemma problem.Finally,we analyze the privacy and verifiability of the scheme,and use the smart contract to simulate the incentive mechanism to show the feasibility in practical application.(2)An incentive-compatible rational delegation computing scheme is proposed.Firstly,we propose a novel 1-n rational delegation computing framework.Under the framework,the game caused by the constructed constraint mechanism has a unique sequential equilibrium,where no rational server will deviate from honest behavior.Secondly,we design the collusion mechanism,solve the sequential equilibrium of the collusion game,and prove that no server with the same computation task will deviate from the collusion.Then,the betrayal mechanism is designed,the frame game and betrayal game are constructed,and the sequential equilibrium of each game is solved,i.e.,no rational server will frame others and deviate from the betrayal.Next,we analyze the privacy,verifiability,and correctness of the scheme.Besides,we simulate three incentive mechanisms using the smart contracts,and give the cost of executing the contracts.Finally,we show the delegation overhead of the scheme.