A Technical Research Of Optimization Of Blockchain Computing Power Resource Allocation

Proof of Work(Po W),as a consensus mechanism for maintaining the security and consistency of the blockchain system,is widely used in various blockchains.In the Po W consensus process,in order to generate a valid block and win the reward,miners have to consume a large amount of computing resources to participate in the competition.How-ever,in recent years,the income of miners has fluctuated due to the fluctuation of vir-tual currency prices,and some miners had to withdraw from the market,resulting in idle computing power.At the same time,in addition to the blockchain network,the rapid development of new technologies such as artificial intelligence,big data analysis,and cloud computing has brought massive computing needs.The current research on the op-timization of the computing power resources of blockchain miners is mainly focused on the technical improvement of the blockchain itself.If the surplus computing resources in the blockchain can be dynamically scheduled and used in the ever-increasing computing demand of the outside world,it can further optimize the utility of miners,reduce overall resource expenditure,and promote the construction of green information systems.This thesis first analyzes the limitations of the existing miners' utility optimization research program,and combines the development of mining equipment and the demand for computing resources from emerging technologies.Then it divides the overall sys-tem into an external ecosystem that includes a large number of computing requirements such as artificial intelligence and cloud computing and a blockchain ecosystem with the blockchain network as the main body.This thesis puts forward a research idea of trans-ferring a large number of computing tasks from the external ecosystem to the blockchain ecosystem.This solution solves the security problem of centralized computing with the help of blockchain decentralization,publicity and transparency.At the same time,it also solves the problem of simplification in the allocation of miners' computing power,further optimizes the utility of miners,and provides a new perspective for the optimal allocation of miners' computing power resources in the future.Next,in the scenario where computing tasks are offloaded to the blockchain net-work,according to the number of computing tasks and the computing power resources of the blockchain network,the allocation strategy of computing power resources is further discussed:(1)When the computing power of the blockchain network is abundant,we propose a one-way computing service that inputs a large number of computing tasks from the exter-nal ecosystem into the blockchain ecosystem,and new types of miners who support mul-tiple computing types in the blockchain network can provide computing services.Then this thesis discusses that the number of tasks is sufficient and there are only new types of miners in the blockchain network.The pricing of computing tasks and the allocation of new types of miners' computing power resources are constructed as a Stackelberg game model,and the model is analyzed to establish a central scheduling scheme for distributing computing tasks.The utility function of the node(Central Scheduling Node,CSN)and the miner is proposed,and the existence of the game equilibrium point is proved.Then this thesis proposes a distributed iterative algorithm for resource allocation under incom-plete information.Through simulation verification,the utility of miners at the equilibrium point has been greatly improved compared to the utility of traditional miners.(2)In view of the surplus and limited computing resources of the blockchain net-work,a two-way blockchain computing power optimization scheduling scenario that in-puts computing tasks from the external ecosystem and outputs the blockchain network mining computing tasks is further proposed.When computing resources are surplus,ex-ternal computing tasks are input to the blockchain ecosystem.When the number of tasks is limited and there are new types of miners that support multiple types of operations and traditional miners who can only perform mining calculations in the blockchain network,the dual competition conditions faced by miners and CSN are studied.A solution to op-timize the utility of both parties through Stackelberg game is proposed,the conditions for the existence of the game equilibrium point are studied,and the utility of miners and the CSN is optimized through a computing task allocation mechanism.When computing resources are limited,the mining tasks of the blockchain ecosystem are output to the exter-nal ecosystem.A computing power resource allocation mechanism based on the auction theory is proposed,and the optimal resource allocation mechanism is obtained through a greedy algorithm,and it is proved that the algorithm meets the economic characteris-tics of the auction mechanism.The simulation proves that when the computing power resources are abundant,the miners working under the mechanism proposed in this thesis have a significant increase in utility compared to traditional miners.When computing re-sources are limited,the mechanism proposed in this paper brings positive effects to the entire blockchain system.