From A Financial Perspective, The Research On The Protection Of Shareholders' Interests Under The Dual-class Share Structure

For innovative enterprises,if they only rely on internal financing,they can not support the normal development needs of enterprises.Therefore,enterprises will adopt a variety of financing methods.However,in recent years,with the adjustment of economic structure and the gradual expansion of innovative enterprises,after a series of financing,the founder's shareholding ratio has been greatly diluted,which has led to a series of control disputes.For this problem,a brand-new equity structure-dual-class share structure came into being.Domestic benchmarking enterprises,such as Alibaba,Jingdong,Baidu and Meituan,are all listed in the United States and Hong Kong with dual-class share structure,which will also lead to the loss of national assets and the outflow of China's core economic information.This makes the ddual-class share structure attracted more attention,and more and more scholars suggest that China should introduce the dual-class share structure.But at present,the relevant theories and systems in China are still not perfect,and more research is still needed.Taking Xiaomi company as an example,this paper focuses on the advantages of the dual-class share structure and the problems in the application of thedual-class share structure,and puts forward solutions to the causes.This article includes the following six parts:the first part is the introduction.Firstly,it expounds the background and significance of this research,discussing the current development status of the dual-class share structure and the necessity of its research.On this basis,it sums up the relevant literature and materials at home and abroad,and then briefly combs the research content,research framework and research methods of this paper,and finally innovates the research of the text point as the end of the first part of the introduction.The second part is the introduction of related concepts and theories.The first part is the definition of related concepts.Then it mainly introduces the principal-agent theory,modern housekeeper theory and tunnel behavior theory.The third part introduces the background and current situation of the company.The fourth part is the analysis of the advantages and problems of the dual-class share structure.The advantages are analyzed through the analysis of corporate control,corporate income and cost,and the problems will be analyzed in terms of corporate income,employee equity incentive and information disclosure.The fifth part is the solution,aiming at the fourth part.It puts forward the improvement measures,which will be carried out from the aspects of giving the founder autonomy,the small and medium-sized shareholders' participation right,improving the benefit distribution system and improving the information disclosure.The sixth part is the conclusion and prospect.It summarizes the content of this paper and expresses the prospect of future research.The innovation of this paper is to study the advantages and disadvantages of the dualclass share structure from the financial perspective,especially for the protection of shareholders' interests as the starting point.It combines the principal-agent theory and modern housekeeper theory,as the theoretical support of this paper,to study how to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders under the dual-class share structure.