| For a long time,enterprise valuation has been an important subject in the field of asset valuation.On October 29,2018,the China Assets Appraisal Association issued a newly revised "Asset Valuation Practice Standards-Enterprise Value" in accordance with the new economic environment.The new standard puts forward higher requirements for asset appraisers to play their own initiative in enterprise value evaluation.How to further promote the innovation of enterprise value evaluation business based on traditional cost method,market method and income method,and make assets Appraisal is more adapted to the needs of the development of the market economy and has become a new issue in the field of asset valuation.In recent years,with the rapid development of China’s market economy and mass media,the reputation of the CEO has played an increasingly important role in the capital market.At present,domestic scholars have regarded the reputation of the CEO as a new type of intangible asset of modern enterprises in China.Researching the impact of CEO reputation on corporate value has gradually become a hot topic for scholars at home and abroad.As one of the three basic activities of an enterprise,investment may directly affect the survival of the enterprise.At the same time,from a macro perspective,investment,as one of the "troikas" driving economic growth,occupies an indispensable position in the country’s economic operation.Inefficient investment behavior will not only cause a huge waste of social resources,hinder the completion of the task of "de-capacity",but also seriously affect the healthy development of the national economy.Reputation is an invisible monitoring and incentive mechanism for the behavior of the CEO.The CEO will change his working attitude,risk appetite and behavioral performance because of his own reputation.In order to obtain a higher evaluation from outside,the CEO will invest in Be more cautious when making decisions,thereby reducing inefficient investment behavior of the enterprise,and ultimately causing changes in corporate value.The literature shows that CEO reputation can affect corporate value from multiple paths,and it also has a certain incentive and restraint effect on inefficient investment.In the past,most studies have adopted some indicators(financial indicators,social impact indicators)to investigate The questionnaire approach is used to explore the different effects of CEO reputation on it.From the perspective of a multivariate model,the research on the relationship between CEO reputation,inefficient investment and corporate value is still lacking.Based on principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,behavioral finance theory,corporate value theory,and free cash flow hypothesis,this article has conducted a series of studies on the relationship between CEO reputation,inefficient investment,and corporate value.Based on China ’s actual conditions,the media ’s role in motivating and supervising the CEOs of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises is quite different.State-owned and non-state-owned enterprises are affected and restricted by factors such as system culture,business philosophy,and selection methods.The difference determines the different ways for the CEO to achieve his own goals.The intermediary effect of inefficient investment on non-state-owned enterprises will be more significant.The differences between over-investment and under-investment enterprises will also affect the role of inefficient investment as a mediator.Based on this,on the basis of combing and integrating relevant literature and analyzing related theories,this article selects the number of Google News reports as the proxy variable for the CEO’s reputation,and selects the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China from 2013 to 2017 as research samples to build a panel model.In enterprises with different ownership and different free cash flow conditions,the effect of inefficient investment on CEO reputation and corporate value was empirically studied,and the robustness of the research results was tested.The results show that to some extent,CEO reputation can reduce the possibility of CEO adverse selection and moral hazard,and increase the value of the company;CEO reputation has a significant inhibitory effect on the inefficient investment behavior of non-state-owned enterprises,and it also affects the value of CEO reputation.Part of the role of intermediary in the impact of the role,but because the state-owned enterprises’ internal culture,election mechanism,etc.have not fully realized marketization,this intermediary effect has not been realized in state-owned enterprises.At the same time,restricted by the free cash flow of enterprises,the intermediary effect of inefficient investment in the overinvestment group is more obvious than in the underinvestment group.At the end,this paper also tries to put forward a lot of policies and suggestions on the incentive measures for the internal management,the reform of the external environment of the enterprise and the business innovation of the assets evaluators in China: first,deepen the reform of the state-owned enterprise system,establish the CEO salary evaluation system guided by the business performance;second,further improve the legal infrastructure and strengthen the construction of the media integrity system;third Asset evaluation should pay attention to the characteristics of management and serve the capital market at a deeper level. |
