Research On The Motivation And Economic Consequences Of Listed Companies Investing In Trust Products

In the capital market of our country,the phenomenon that the capital of listed company is occupied by the major shareholders often occurs.The controlling shareholders frequently take the resources of listed company as their own by virtue of their absolute position in the company.This phenomenon hinders the healthy development of China's securities market.The behavior of large shareholders occupying the funds of listed companies will not only hinder the normal production and operation activities of listed companies,damage the interests of small and medium shareholders,and even make listed companies face delisting due to violation of laws and regulations.In order to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors and maintain the good operation of the securities market,the relevant regulatory authorities have launched a series of regulatory laws and regulations,which to some extent eased the phenomenon of large shareholders occupying funds.However,due to the limitations of the current regulatory measures in China,and the defects of the current equity structure of most companies,under the condition of strengthening the supervision of the common fund occupation behavior,the risk of using the traditional way of fund occupation also increases,many shareholders began to find a new way to use the loopholes of relevant laws and regulations to find a new way of occupation,which has a serious impact Sound the orderly development of China's securities market.Therefore,to reveal the new means of controlling shareholders' occupation of listed companies' funds,and to study the motivation and economic consequences of the behavior of controlling shareholders' occupation of funds is conducive to the supervision of the large shareholders' occupation of funds,to protect the interests of small and medium investors,and to ensure the stable operation of China's securities market.Based on the analysis of the event of capital occupation by the controlling shareholders of Fenghua company,combined with the relevant theories,this paper studies how to identify whether the behavior of the major shareholders is investment or capital occupation under the current situation of strengthening the supervision of the traditional way of capital occupation.In view of the behavior that the majority shareholders of Fenghua stock purchase trust products,through analysis,it is found that the majority shareholders purchase trust products,ostensibly for financial management,is actually a new way of capital occupation.Through the case study,it is found that the majority shareholders use the listed companies to purchase trust products on the surface,to conduct financial management,but in fact,they use the loopholes of relevant laws and regulations to occupy funds.The trust products become a tool for the majority shareholders to occupy the interests of the listed companies,affecting the normal operation of the company,and ultimately leading to the risk of delisting of the listed companies.Therefore,it will expose a new way of fund occupation for the management,regulatory authorities and stakeholders,and put forward suggestions for strengthening the supervision of controlling shareholders' fund occupation,and put forward their own opinions on how to improve the relevant supervision system,so as to promote the securities market to develop a more perfect supervision system,strengthen the supervision of trust products,prevent such incidents from happening again,and make the trust products return Return to the source,play a role in promoting the good allocation of resources,so that the long-term development of the securities market.