| Many issue areas of international relations are co-managed by overlapping or loosely coupled international institutions that offer state actors the possibility of new strategies of action and influence the effectiveness of international governance.For a long time,international institutions have been considered as independent actors operating independently of each other,but with their proliferation and increasing institution density,scholars have introduced the concept of regime complex and attracted much attention.The complex of international institutions has an impact on the action strategies of countries,and provides countries with opportunities for institution selection and institution transfer.Some scholars tend to believe that these strategies are not conducive to the effectiveness of global governance arrangements because they undermine institutional commitments and create competition among international institutions.They see the lack of orchestration as a structural flaw in global governance and highlight the need for governance structures that orchestrate the regulatory activities of overlapping international institutions.On the contrary,this paper argues that in the absence of central authority,the proliferation of international institutions produces processes of adaptation,orchestration,and compliance among various institutions,forming a rational division of labor among institutions,and the state utilizes these processes to form institutionalized cooperation elasticity.Mechanistic complexity does not necessarily imply chaos,anarchy,or disorder,but may also have structural coherence.Therefore,this paper attempts to link the action strategies of actors in a highly institutionalized international system with institutional adaptation,institutional deference,and institutional flexibility in an environment of institutional competition with overlapping functions,and analyzes the operation of institutional orchestration in the context of complex international institutions.Compliance is a tool used by member states of international organizations to manage overlapping jurisdictions between international institutions.Institutional deference is essential for effective multilateral cooperation,enabling institutions to avoid the adoption of conflicting rules and to reap efficiency gains through division of labor.International institutions with overlapping functions operate in the context of nested games,and while there will be opportunities to exploit institution choice to pursue their narrow interests,assuming roughly equal distribution of power among different institutions,complex forms of institutional adaptation may arise,and The process of institutional adaptation gradually generates a spontaneous division of labor among the overlapping institutions of organizational governance activities.For the complexities of global governance institutions,the time for effective measures to effectively overcome potentially competitive consequences in the field of governance is the design of international institutions.Institutional design can consciously control complex linkages for specific purposes.In the process of institutional design,institutional flexibility requires special attention.A flexible institution with good adaptability can help alleviate the institution conflict in the regime complexity and establish a new and orderly international order when the exogenous factors remain unchanged.By studying how to manage and overcome inter-institution conflicts and tensions,this paper not only contributes to the study of international institutions at the theoretical level,but also has practical significance for promoting more effective global governance at the practical level.For the international community,a reasonable division of labor can be formed by reducing unnecessary wear and tear between international institutions.For China,it can help reduce the doubts China faces in participating in international affairs and play a more active role in global governance. |
