Research On Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism Of Residual Control Right Between Public And Private Parties In Pension PPP Project

In recent years,the elderly population in China has increased significantly,and the severity of social aging is becoming more and more serious.The citizen have strong demand for elderly care products and services.However,there is a huge gap between the supply and demand of elderly care services in China.In order to reduce financial burdenthe of government and improve the efficiency of the use of funds,the government encourages social capital to actively participate in the development of pension service industry,and strongly supports the use of PPP（Public Private Partnership,public-private partnership model）to provide pension products and services.However,due to the limited rationality of participants,the long-term nature of cooperation,the incompleteness of information and the uncertainty of the surrounding environment,the PPP contract signed by both parties is incomplete.There may be power struggles and interest disputes between them,which may damage the cooperative relationship of the project,thereby affecting the sustainable development of the project.It is necessary to adjust the allocation of control rights among partners through an effective residual control rights adjustment mechanism,improve the project contract structure,and increase the possibility of project success.From the perspective of stakeholders,combined with the characteristics of pension projects,this thesis constructs an evolutionary game model of the adjustment mechanism of residual control rights between the public and private parties in pension PPP projects,and then analyzes the evolutionary laws and influencing factors of residual control rights between the public and private parties.This thesis provides a theoretical basis for the allocation of control rights in pension PPP projects in China.First,through literature reading and expert interviews,the key factors affecting the allocation of residual control rights of pension projects are collected,the list of factors is determined.The principal component analysis is used to extract the key variables.Secondly,starting from the costs and benefits of the participation of the core subjects,an evolutionary game model of the transfer of residual control rights between the public and private parties is established,and the replication dynamic equation method is used to solve it.Through numerical simulation,the influence of parameter variables on the strategy selection of each agent is analyzed,and the evolution and stability path of each agent is dynamically simulated,which verifies the correctness of the theoretical analysis.Finally,based on the conclusions,it puts forward countermeasures and suggestions to improve the governance of pension PPP projects.The main conclusions of the thesis are as follows.（1）There are multiple evolutionary paths in the evolutionary game system of the residual control right dynamic adjustment mechanism between the public and private parties of the pension PPP project.The initial state of the strategy selection of the public and private parties and the value of the key parameters determine the evolutionary stable state.（2）Relational contract savings coefficient,incremental cost,regulatory penalties,private benefits of control of social capital and the proportion of government equity have a negative incentive effect on the adjustment of residual control rights between public and private parties;cooperative reward,risk punishment and risk compensation have positive incentive effect.（3）The strategy choice of the public sector is more sensitive to changes in the coefficient of relationship contracts,cooperative incentives,private benefits of control,the proportion of government equity and regulatory penalties.The strategic choice of the private sector is more sensitive to the changes in cooperation costs,cooperation rewards,private benefits of control,the proportion of government equity,and the intensity of risk penalties and compensation.The above research conclusions are conducive to improving the project governance theory of pension PPP,reasonably and effectively expanding the application of incomplete contract theory and control theory in pension PPP projects,and establishing an effective governance mechanism with control as the core for pension projects that adopt the PPP model.Provide theoretical guidance and decision-making reference.