Case Analysis On Qihoo V.Tencent Abuse Of Dominant Market

While technological advances have driven the development of the Internet,abuse of dominant market position has also occurred among Internet companies.Cases like "National Medical Network v.Baidu" and Alibaba’s "two-for-one" behaviour in April 2021 have attracted public attention.Theoretical and practical circles have been discussing whether free goods meet the relevant market’s definition under the Antimonopoly Law.In April 2021,the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration has considered Alibaba’s "two-for-one" behaviour as abuse the dominant market position.The main reason for this is that major countries and regions worldwide have more experience in regulating anti-monopoly practices in traditional industries and have developed a relatively mature approach in dealing with anti-monopoly disputes in conventional industries.However,in the face of the problems arising in the emerging Internet industry,the methods usually used in the traditional sector define the relevant market,presume market share,identify monopoly agreements,determine tying behaviour,and other market dominance abuses are facing more significant challenges.By searching many similar cases,the article uses the typical case of Qihoo v.Tencent as an entry point for group case analysis.The paper analyzes the specific manifestations and application dilemmas of the abuse of market dominance from defining the relevant market,determining the market position,"two-for-one",and tied sales.The traditional method of describing the relevant market has two problems:first,the demand substitution analysis,as one of the crucial methods of defining the relevant market,may be applied with an excessive scope of subjective discretion;second,the characteristics of the Internet make the application of the hypothetical monopolist test difficult,mainly because Internet products are mostly zero-price products,and the traditional The main reason is that most Internet products are zero-price products,and the conventional SSNIP analysis of "price increase" will have a qualitative change when applied directly to zero-price Internet products.In the past,market share was calculated through revenue and store coverage,and the State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration also took service revenue as well as platform transactions into account when determining Alibaba Group’s market share.Currently,most Internet products do not use direct transactions as their main means of profitability,so enforcement authorities have experienced difficulties in applying them in their determinations.However,the number of users as well as the penetration rate can be combined.A large number of users represents wide coverage,and a high penetration rate can also reflect high user stickiness;secondly,the ability to control the market is not entirely consistent in the bilateral market,and most Internet companies do not have the ability to control transactions in the user market where free usage is used to obtain traffic.However,if an enterprise or platform has accumulated a large user base,for advertisers and platform merchants with profit demand,the enterprise has a higher control ability in content and advertisement placement,cost calculation;in addition,according to Article 11 of the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Platform Economy,the ability to master and process data also becomes a criterion for considering market dominance,which is also the enterprise’s strong financial strength and technical This is a reflection of the strong financial and technological power of the enterprise.On the basis of having a large amount of user data,the company is also able to process the user’s behavioral preferences and complete "accurate and personalized pushing" of information according to the background algorithm.This technology can greatly optimize the user experience,but may also become a bargaining chip with advertisers and platform businesses.Before determining whether the "two-for-one" behavior is subject to the antitrust law,it is necessary to make a judgment on the purpose of the operator’s behavior.In determining to tie,a distinction must be made between tying that reduces risk and improves efficiency and tying that restricts competition for "unjustified" reasons.In the last chapter,some thoughts and suggestions are made on the determination of abuse of dominant position: first,when defining the relevant market,the demand substitutability should be analyzed from multiple perspectives,i.e.,through application scenarios,user groups,Etc.,at the same time,supply substitution analysis should be given more weight in market definition methods,for example,analyzing product independence from the perspective of supply substitution and analyzing the impact of network effects and lock-in effects;in addition,a quality assessment index system should be established according to the characteristics of Internet products,and the scope of quality decline should be clarified when applying the "quality decline" model of the hypothetical monopolist test.Secondly,the identification path and regulatory philosophy of exclusive transactions.The path of determination is mainly based on whether the transaction risks and costs of the counterparty are generated or increased by the exclusive transaction;and since the Internet is a new industry,although there is industry chaos,it should maintain an inclusive and prudent regulatory philosophy,which requires a judgment based on the actual situation of the enterprise,rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.