Bankruptcy reorganization is a legal institution that balances the relationship of various interests,especially the interests of creditors,distressed enterprises and the whole society.Its advantage lies in comprehensively considering the interests of all parties in the reorganization,fairly solving the problems of creditor’s rights and debts,and finally achieving a win-win situation.The tax law,on the other hand,focuses more on protecting national interests with the primary goal of ensuring national tax revenue and maintaining a stable tax source.The difference between the two laws leads to the conflict in the setting and application of the rules,and the tax preference in bankruptcy reorganization is the prominent point of the conflict.In the restructuring procedure,the tax authority,as one of the bankrupt creditors of the restructured enterprise,shall,according to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law,participate in the creditors’ meeting.And appropriate adjustments should be made to the rights of creditors,through negotiation among all parties.However,according to the provisions of the tax law,the tax creditor’s rights are "debts of the public law" and represent the interests of the state,and shall not be reduced or reduced arbitrarily without legal procedures.However,China has not yet established a unified and clear tax preferential legal system specifically for the bankrupt and restructured enterprises,resulting in the tax relief for the restructured enterprises become impossible to follow.High tax burden,difficult relief undoubtedly increased the cost of enterprise restructuring,hit the enthusiasm of the restructuring parties,has also become one of the important factors hindering the success of enterprise restructuring,affecting the play of the value of the restructuring system.Around the court also actively explore "fu yuan" linkage mechanism or to reduce the tax burden on enterprises reply way,in the case that the practice of "one case one meeting" can better help the case for the realization of the aim of reforming success,and has the flexibility and practicality,but with the tax legal,taxation fair principle,there are some contradictions have not fundamentally solve the problem.Therefore,this paper will carry out a study on the tax incentives in the bankruptcy reorganization,find out the shortcomings of the existing norms in China,and provide corresponding solutions.In this paper,based on the basic literature,combined with the case and recent statistical data to analyze the research problems,mainly divided into four parts: First,from the basic theory of bankruptcy reorganization system,analysis of the value of the system objectives and concepts.At the same time,it is proposed that the bankruptcy reorganization enterprises should be treated specially in terms of tax revenue,and tax relief should be made to ensure the success of enterprise reorganization.And find the theoretical basis for the tax preference law of bankruptcy reorganization from the Angle of quantity tax,tax special zone and field law respectively.At the same time,it analyzes the heavy burden and harm caused by the lack of tax preferential legal system for enterprise bankruptcy reorganization and the value it can bring after the perfection of the system.Secondly,by combing China’s existing tax preferential legal system(including policies),combined with classic cases and recent statistical data,in-depth and comprehensive analysis of China’s current tax incentives institution in the area of bankruptcy reorganization problems and causes;Thirdly,by combing and analyzing the special tax treatment in the bankruptcy reorganization of developed countries and regions outside the region,and combining with China’s national conditions,we find out the parts that can be used for reference in China.Finally,from the macro concept level and micro specific rules setting level to improve China’s bankruptcy reorganization tax preference system corresponding suggestions,in order to ensure the effective play of the reorganization system value and maintain social stability. |