Research On The Impact Of The Promotion Motivation Of Local Officials On The Debt Financing Scale Of State-owned Listed Enterprises

In recent years,the level of leverage in China’s non-financial corporate sector has continued to rise,far above the international warning level,which is likely to trigger systemic financial risks and affect stable economic development.In order to effectively resolve debt risks,the government has formulated a supply-side structural reform policy with "deleveraging" as the core.However,the debt ratio of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises is diverging,and the debt ratio of state-owned enterprises remains high.This has something to do with the continued macroeconomic downturn and insufficient market demand,but does this phenomenon also reflect an inherent logic:that is,state-owned property rights and the institutional background behind it are also an important factor affecting the company’s asset-liability ratio?Based on this,this article is based on China’s specific institutional environment,determines the "political view" of local government intervention in the management of local state-owned listed companies as a research perspective,constructs local officials promotion incentive indicators,and establishes officials promotion incentives and local state-owned enterprise debt The empirical model of the relationship between the two,and from the dynamic and static perspectives,examine the impact of promotion incentives on the liabilities of local state-owned listed companies,and then further discuss the role of corporate investment expenditures under the influence of official administrative power.Finally,Test the stability and endogenity of the conclusion.The study found that promotion incentives have a significant positive impact on the debt scale of state-owned enterprises,significantly improving the debt capacity of the enterprise,and slowing down the adjustment and repair of the capital structure,increasing the degree of state-owned enterprise debt ratio deviating from the optimal level for a long time.In the end,the company’s leverage ratio remains high for a long time.Further research shows that corporate investment expenditure is an intermediary variable between local officials’ promotion incentives and corporate liabilities,which has played a role in transmission.The above situation is more obvious in Central China,Northwest,Southwest,and Northeast China.This may be related to the economic development status and marketization of the regions.Finally,based on the conclusions of empirical research,this article puts forward policy recommendations for the formation of a long-term mechanism for corporate debt risk control: broaden corporate financing channels,change corporate thinking of relying on debt financing for investment production,and adopt both internal and external financing methods,have a good job in the coordinated and linked development of multi-level capital markets.