Political Promotion、Perks And R&D Investment Of Stated-owned Enterprises

In recent years,with the country’s increasing support for innovation,as a key force in China’s economic development,the innovation activities of state-owned enterprises have also attracted the attention of the public and scholars.As the formulators and participants of corporate,the incentive mechanism of executives has become a key factor affecting corporate innovation activities.Thus this paper explains the connection between implicit incentives,including political promotion or perks,and R&D investment.We choose 1,105 executive change samples of A-share state-owned listed companies in the five years from 2014 to 2018,and collect the specific direction of executives’ change to define the strength of political promotion incentives.And we find finally political promotion incentives will curb R&D investment in state-owned enterprises.Moreover,there is an alternative relationship between perks and political promotion incentives,also perks will weaken the correlation between political promotion and R&D investment.Specifically,based on the implicit incentive concept of perks,it makes up for the lack of effectiveness of other incentive mechanisms of state-owned enterprise executives,and mitigate the restraining effect on R&D investment under the motivation of political promotion.Further research find that the suppression of R&D investment by political promotion is more obvious in the sample of the chairman group,and the moderating role of perk on the relationship between the two is only reflected in the sample of CEO.We think that this may be related to the identity of the chairman and CEO and their different perceptions of power.According to the final conclusions of this article,we hope to provide some advices for how to establish multiple incentive mechanisms for state-owned enterprise executives,optimize their political promotion and selection mechanism,and improve supervision and constraints on state-owned enterprise executives.