On The Limitation Of Punishment Scope Of Abstract Dangerous Crime

With increasing numbers of new types of risk in society and advancing theories of risky criminal law,abstract danger as one type of danger is increasingly favored by state legislators for its ability to provide more advanced protection from legal benefits.As an example in our country,the criminal revision(eight)and criminal revision(nine)greatly adopted the legislative model of abstract danger offenders.However,although the relatively easy identification process of abstract danger is conducive to better control and control risks,it also carries the risk of violating citizen freedom,and nowadays abstract danger is associated with a problem of wide range and probation,which,in order to make the sword of equitable justice to justice correct,requires a reasonable limitation to the scope of punishment for abstract danger.This paper is mainly divided into the following four chapters:The first chapter is an overview of abstract danger offenders,this chapter begins with an introduction to the concept of abstract danger offenders and the basis for punishments,and by combing over various doctrines comes to the conclusion that "" abstract danger "" should also be a constitutive requirement for abstract danger offenders.Second,by differentiating the boundaries of abstract danger from behavioral and specific danger,we conclude that "" abstract danger "" is the legislative presumption of danger,but allows the respondent to disprove that it does not exist.Finally,we show a trend toward legislative generalization of abstract danger offenders by teasing through recent criminal corrections to bedding up later limitations.The second chapter is on the reasons for limiting abstract danger mistakes,and this chapter makes detailed arguments from the theory to practice level that require reasons for limiting abstract danger mistakes.In short,theoretically speaking,abstract danger’s generalization trends detract from misreading of social theory of risk,detract from the modesty of criminal law,and disregard for guilt.From a practical point of view,the legislative model of abstract danger offenders makes legal applicability difficult,and our country’s free probation main sentence system also makes some abstract danger offenders heavily penalized.Overall,the tendency to generalize abstract danger is neither theoretical nor practical and requires constraints on abstract danger.The third chapter is the legislative path to abstract a dangerous person’s restriction,and this chapter presents three paths to abstract a dangerous person’s restriction from the legislative level.First,it is to use the double-layer law benefit view to review the current norm,which is to analyze existing single-layer law benefits not conforming to the construct of abstract danger offenders,and to advocate the use of the double-layer law benefit view to review current norms of crime not conforming to the double-layer law benefit construct to exclude abstract danger offenders.The second is the creation of special abortors,which,by modifying the provisions of the general principles of criminal law,enable abstract offenders to also be established with criminal suspension to achieve probation.The last is to optimize sentence bridging,which alleviates the poor connection between criminal and administrative law in the context of abstract danger by adding supplementary terms to blank norms and adding sentence barriers.Chapter 4 is an abstract of judicial paths to dangerous crime restraints,and this chapter presents two routes to restraints from a judicial level.First,the introduction of the respondent’s system of evidence,which allows the respondent to come up with evidence that his or her actions do not produce a statutory hazard,justifies the standard only as much as reasonably reasonable doubt by a general rational person that "" danger "" does not exist.Second,the exclusion of understudied intentional acts requires that one must know the connotation of the normative constituting elements involved in the act,while also knowing that the act may give rise to dangerous results,or that criminal intent is not established and does not constitute an abstract danger.