The central bank’s macro-prudential supervision power refers to the central bank’s power to supervise and manage the overall financial system from top to bottom in order to maintain the stability of the financial system,to prevent and respond to systemic financial risks,and to protect the rights and interests of financial consumers.Different from the micro-prudential supervision power of other regulatory agencies,the central bank’s macro-prudential supervision power may focus more on systemically important financial institutions that can affect the security of the entire financial system.Since the international financial crisis,the importance of macro-prudential supervision has been highlighted.Therefore,a series of reforms have been carried out internationally.Countries including the United States and the United Kingdom have given their central banks a core position in the macro-prudential supervision system.The EU has also absorbed The power of the member states is concentrated on the European Central Bank.In recent years,although the People’s Bank of China’s macro-prudential supervision power has been continuously explored,there are still shortcomings in the current legislation,especially the higher-level legislation has not yet systematically and comprehensively stipulated the People’s Bank of China’s macro-prudential supervision power.This article focuses on the research on how to improve the People’s Bank of China’s macro-prudential supervision power,and conducts a logical analysis from four levels of power subject,content,procedure and accountability.The first part puts forward the meaning and characteristics of the central bank’s macro-prudential supervision power,and discusses the theoretical basis,mainly including the state intervention theory and the financial integrated supervision theory,which proposes the necessity of establishing the central bank macro-prudential supervision power,including the following three points :The first is to coordinate the financial supervision power under the goal of financial stability;the second is to achieve the goal of dual-pillar regulation of monetary policy and macro-prudential policies;the third is to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of financial consumers.The second part compares the reforms of the United States,the United Kingdom,the European Union and Japan from three levels of power,focusing on the analysis of a series of reforms carried out by the United Kingdom,the United States,and the European Union after the international financial crisis and Japan’s useful experience in avoiding risk shocks.The fourth part analyzes the aforementioned dilemmas encountered by the People’s Bank of China’s macro-prudential supervision power,and puts forward corresponding suggestions for improvement in conjunction with the relevant content of the "People’s Bank of China(Revised Draft for Comment)" : It is necessary to clarify that the People’s Bank of China’s macro The status of the main body in prudential supervision and the specific internal institutions that exercise powers,and the content and operating procedures of the macro-prudential supervision power have been sorted out.At the same time,it is recommended to establish an accountability system for the macro-prudential supervision power,and the People’s Bank of China and its performance personnel Conduct effective supervision of the behaviors in order to better maintain the stability of the financial system. |