The Research On The Cartel Leniency Program Of Antitrust Law

The hard core cartel,as a very common form of monopoly organization,is extremely harmful,and has always been the target of anti-monopoly law.However,the inherent hidden nature of the hard core cartel makes it difficult to be known to the outside world,which makes it more difficult for antitrust law enforcement agencies to investigate.The long-term maintenance of the hard core cartels has enabled cartel members to obtain huge illegal profits while damaging the legitimate rights and interests of other operators and consumers,and destroying a fair and free market competition environment.In order to crack down on the hard core cartels more effectively,the United States first developed leniency policy in 1978,then revised the corporate leniency policy in 1993,and then in 1994 formulated the individual leniency policy.The European Union followed suit with the introduction of leniency program in 1996 and two amendments in 2002 and 2006.The leniency program effectively resolved the difficulty of obtaining evidence by antitrust law enforcement agencies by splitting and dismantling the hard core cartels from the inside,and significantly improved the efficiency of the hard core cartels’ investigation.In view of the great advantages of the leniency program in investigating and dealing with hard core cartels,many countries have provided leniency program in their antitrust law.Article 46(2)of the Anti-Monopoly Law,which was implemented in China in 2008,provides for the principle of the leniency program.The Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements specifies the evidence conditions,the scope and quantity of the leniency program.China’s leniency program has played an important role in cracking down on cartels.Cases such as the Japanese auto parts case and the Zhejiang insurance case have been investigated and punished through the leniency program.However,China’s leniency program started late,and there are still many problems in related legislation and judicial practice.For example,our leniency program does not explicitly exclude the applicable objects and scope of application,the design of marginal treatment is unreasonable,and the conditions for leniency are not comprehensive.In addition,the leniency program is an important measure to promote public enforcement of antitrust,and the disclosure of leniency information helps to promote the development of private lawsuits for damages.Therefore,how to deal with the relationship between the disclosure of leniency information and private enforcement is also an issue to be considered.Therefore,to improve the leniencyprogram of China ’s anti-monopoly law,it is necessary to legislate to exclude those who are compelled to apply the leniency program,it is clear that the leniency program is only applicable to horizontal monopoly agreements,stipulates a reasonable margin of the leniency program,and clearly defines the behavioral conditions of the leniency program,strict legal liability,perfect the leniency program procedure,and strengthen international cooperation in antitrust enforcement.