Research On Incentive Subsidy Mode Of Rail Transit

As a rail transit connecting the urban area of the central city and the surrounding groups in the metropolitan area,the urban railway can provide commuting,public transportation,high-speed and large volume transportation services,effectively promote the optimization of urban functional layout,better play the leading role of the central city,realize the coordinated development within the Metropolitan area,and support the construction of new urbanization.With the acceleration of the construction of China’s metropolitan area and new urbanization,the city railway ushers in a major development opportunity.As a quasi public product,under the strategy of low ticket price,because of its commuter passenger flow characteristics and public transportation organization mode,most of the urban railway operation is in the problem of loss.With the further expansion of construction and operation scale,the sustainable development of urban railway economy has become a key issue.Taking the city railway subsidy as the research object,this paper compares and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of direct subsidy,indirect subsidy and resource subsidy,and proposes that resource subsidy can realize the incentive effect by bringing excess income to the operators.It qualitatively constructs the incentive subsidy mode of city railway,and divides the incentive subsidy mode into weak resource subsidy mode,indirect subsidy mode and resource subsidy mode Strong resource subsidies and full market subsidies.In this paper,the triangular fuzzy number,Monte Carlo stochastic simulation and Markowitz mean variance model are combined to estimate the possible benefits of each subsidy mode,and the portfolio risk is measured by stochastic simulation.Through expert consultation and set-valued statistics,the possible rate of return of each subsidy method is obtained.Oracle crystal ball is used for simulation and optimization,and the reasonable proportion of different Subsidy Methods in the construction period and operation period under different risk preferences is obtained.Through comparative analysis of optimization results,it is proposed that cooperative development should be given priority to while independent development should be supplemented in resource development,Nine incentive subsidy schemes in construction period and eight incentive subsidy schemes in operation period are obtained,and the incentive effect of resource subsidy is quantitatively evaluated.Under the assumption of bounded rationality,considering the positive externality of rail transit,government construction capital investment and operation subsidies,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of superior government and inferior government under the horizontal intergovernmental relationship.This paper investigates the influence of the parameters in the model on the equilibrium state,and puts forward three incentive measures:reward,punishment and income redistribution mechanism of the superior government.The results show that the appropriate government subsidy sharing rate can effectively promote the two sides to adopt positive investment strategy in practice,and the reward,punishment and reasonable and effective income redistribution mechanism of the superior government can enhance the probability of the two sides to work together,reduce the possibility of both sides to choose negative cooperation at the same time,adjust the relationship between the boundary points,and avoid the negotiation deadlock.Finally,the paper puts forward some strategic suggestions from five aspects,such as clarifying the development orientation,ensuring the sustainable and stable land supply,accelerating the cultivation of passenger flow,improving the conversion rate of passenger flow to commercial flow,and promoting the comprehensive development of urban railway with high quality.