Earnings Management Of Backdoor Listed Companies Based On Performance Commitment

In recent years,backdoor listing has become a popular choice for enterprises to go public with low cost,low threshold,high efficiency and other advantages.Backdoor listing started at the end of the 20 th century in China,and its history is relatively short.Compared with some European and American countries,there are still some deficiencies in policies and regulations.To solve the existing problems,performance commitment is gradually applied to backdoor listing.The original intention of performance commitment is to alleviate the information asymmetry in the transaction,ensure the relative fairness of the transaction,and protect the interests of minority shareholders.And,the CSRC has more stringent regulations on performance compensation of backdoor listing with relatively weak regulation.However,according to the actual application of performance commitment,the effect of performance commitment is not satisfactory.Accurate performance standards and performance gap are quite common.Therefore,earnings management of backdoor listing companies during the performance commitment period has attracted market attention and should conduct further study.Firstly,this paper summarizes the literature on backdoor listing,performance commitment and earnings management,and reviews the relevant theoretical basis.Then,on the basis of information asymmetry theory,signal transmission theory,incomplete contract theory and principal-agent theory,combining theory with case,and taking the back door transaction between Changsheng biological and Huanghai machinery as an example,this paper analyzes the relationship between performance commitment of backdoor listing and enterprise earnings management,and how to achieve earnings management.Firstly,this paper briefly introduces the basic information of both parties,backdoor trading and performance compensation commitment.Combined with the overall situation of the market and the industry,this paper analyzes the performance commitment of the case company,and leads to the case analysis below.Secondly,this paper uses empirical identification method to identify the vertical and horizontal earnings management,and then uses the extended Jones model to measure earnings management.Thirdly,this paper summarizes the methods of earnings management of case company.Fourthly,combined with the theoretical basis mentioned above,this paper analyzes the motivation of earnings management from the perspective of backdoor listing and performance commitment.Through case analysis,this paper draws a conclusion that backdoor listing and performance commitment make enterprises have the motivation of earnings management and there are specific accrual earnings management and real earnings management during the performance commitment period.Based on the research conclusion,this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to regulate backdoor listing,give full play to the positive effect of performance commitment,and restrain earnings management of enterprises in performance commitment period.The innovation of this paper lies in:(1)This paper analyzes backdoor listing,performance commitment and earnings management,and discusses the relationship between performance commitment and earnings management;(2)In this paper,empirical identification method and model measurement method are used to analyze the earnings management of the case company,and through the vertical comparison of the enterprise itself,the horizontal comparison with the competitors in the same industry,and the model test based on the industry data,this paper makes the results more convincing.However,this paper selects a single case company to study,so the universality of the conclusion needs further confirmation.