Research On Blockchain Mining Behavior Based On Game Theory

The consensus process is at the heart of the blockchain.The most popular consensus mechanism in the blockchain consensus mechanism is Proof of Work(Po W),which is also the consensus mechanism used in Bitcoin.If the value of Bitcoin rises,so does the number of people who participate in mining,and the overall processing capacity of the network grows.Miners who rely solely on their own computing resources find it difficult to mine blocks in a limited period of time.As a result,miners would opt to enter a mining pool for cooperative mining in order to secure a steady income.If the mining pool’s computing capacity grows,once it reaches 51 percent,the mining pool would have full control over the entire blockchain system.As a result,understanding how miners choose mining pools is critical to ensuring the blockchain’s stability.The mining behavior in the blockchain system based on proof of work is investigated in this thesis,beginning with the benefit method and potential attack behavior of the mining pool,and using related game theory theories.This thesis’ key contribution is as follows:First and foremost,this thesis examines the income of miners in P2Pool(Per-to-Per Pool)and PPSP(Pay Per Shares Plus)mining pools from the viewpoint of miners,and then uses the income formula to create a dynamic mining pool selection model.The main factors that influence miners’ pool selection behavior are investigated using model analysis.As a result,by changing parameters such as incentives and encouraging more miners to enter the pool,the pool administrator can effectively avoid the loss of miners.This thesis considers the impact of miners’ greedy psychology on mining pool selection based on the above model.When other parameters in the blockchain network remain constant,greedy miners and non-greedy miners select mining pools differently,with greedy miners preferring gambling P2Pool-type mining pools and non-greedy miners preferring non-gambling PPSP-type mining pools.Finally,this thesis aims to prevent mining pool interception attacks by classifying mining pools into two categories: attacking mining pools and non-attacking mining pools.A prediction of the number of mining pools is constructed by comparing the revenue of the two types of mining pools.The model’s equilibrium point is evaluated,the local stability of the equilibrium point is proven,and the relevant conclusions are tested by simulation experiments using relevant game theory theories.In summary,this thesis examines the effect of mining pool fees,mining costs,and the computational power needed to enter a mining pool on miners’ mining pool selection,as well as the impact of block interception attacks on the evolution of mining pools,using related game theory theories.The related theoretical findings are critical for maintaining the blockchain network’s protection and stability.