Research On Third Degree Price Discrimination Based On Repeated Game

Research on the implementation of third-degree price discrimination and the interactive use of second and third-degree price discrimination based on repeated games(including unlimited repeated games and indefinite repeated games),which can not only enrich the theory of third-degree price discrimination,but also provide reference for manufacturers' pricing decisions,and has theoretical and practical significance.This thesis establishes a repeated game model and solves its equilibrium results to draw some practical conclusions.At the same time,the established model is verified through computer simulation and example analysis,which proves the rationality of the model and has practical guiding value.The specific research content is as follows:(1)In the research part of the three-degree price discrimination infinitely repeated game,based on the random demand function,this thesis discusses the equilibrium analysis of the three-degree price discrimination infinitely repeated game of two competing firms with very different strengths,and obtains the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the two firms under the influence of the discount factor and the corresponding trigger strategy.And according to the trigger strategy,designs three action plans of the manufacturer 2,comparing the profits brought by the three plans,the critical discount factor is further derived.(2)In response to the third-degree price discrimination indefinite repetitive game problem,based on the assumption of the termination probability of the game,the Stackberg model of the indefinite repeated game is derived,and the equilibrium result is analyzed to give the manufacturer's game strategy.According to the game strategy,a specific simulation plan is designed.By analyzing the simulation results,a statistically balanced analysis is obtained.(3)In response to the repeated game of second and third degree price discrimination,this thesis uses the repeated game method to analyze the pricing behavior of two oligarchs with very different strengths that simultaneously implement second-degree and third-degree price discrimination,compares the benefits of the two manufacturers in the case of only implementing third-degree price discrimination and the interactive use of second-degree and third-degree price discrimination.The results show that whether it is cooperation,competition or deviation in the process of cooperation,the interactive use of second and third degree price discrimination will bring more profits to the manufacturer than when only implementing third degree price discrimination.Finally,in order to further illustrate the interaction effect,a specific calculation example is designed,and the results show that simultaneous implementation of second-degree and third-degree price discrimination is indeed better than only implementation of third-degree price discrimination.