The structure and epistemic import of empirical multiple determination in scientific practice

Empirical (or experimental) multiple determination (multiple determination, for short) is the epistemic strategy of establishing the same result by means of multiple independent empirical (or experimental) procedures. It is considered to be an important epistemic virtue praised by both philosophers of science and practicing scientists. Commentators from different contexts have referred to multiple determination as one of the main strategies scientific researchers use to establish the reliability of empirical results. Multiple determination has been used in order to address a variety of problems that arise as a consequence of the fallibility of empirical and experimental procedures. It is generally believed that being able to establish the same result (or provide evidence for a hypothesis of interest) by means of different and theoretically independent procedures is "better" than doing the same by only one procedure. Despite this appeal of the multiple determination strategy, however, not much philosophical analysis has been provided regarding the grounds on which its epistemic desirability and virtues rest. Not much has been said regarding the structure and rationale underlying arguments which rely on multiple determination and there is no general agreement regarding the epistemological import of these arguments.;It is the aim of this dissertation to address these issues. More specifically, it: a. Provides a conceptual clarification of the epistemic strategy of multiple determination by making evident its differences in structure and epistemic import from other notions and epistemic strategies form which it is often not distinguished, such as Robustness, Consilience of Inductions, Variety of Evidence, etc. b. Traces the historical and philosophical roots of multiple determination in the 19th century philosophical discussions and scientific developments. Especially, it makes the claim that the emergence of empirical multiple determination as a distinctive epistemic strategy emerged as a response to the scientific and philosophical difficulties facing the atomic and molecular hypotheses of matter at the end of the 19th century. c. Provides a general conceptual framework for understanding the structure and epistemic import of arguments that rely on the application of the multiple determination strategy in actual scientific practice. d. Considers the implications of the debates regarding the structure and epistemic import of the multiple determination strategy for the relationship between history and philosophy of science.