| While there are numerous indications that political executives use their authority to limit how effectively citizens can monitor their performance, the executive power/government transparency nexus is not well developed in the literature. I present theoretical frameworks explaining that executives have multiple incentives to maintain information asymmetries in their own favor, that they have specified and accrued powers that most politicians lack, and that they systematically use those powers to restrict the flow and publication of government-related information. Accordingly, I hypothesize a negative relationship between executive power and transparency. Using new panel data on the executive powers of both heads of state and heads of government, I find support for this hypothesis in Central and Eastern Europe for multiple dimensions of transparency. I present strong evidence that increased executive power is associated with decreases in media freedom, and considerable evidence that executive power impedes budget transparency and the efficacy of freedom of information acts. My analyses explain much of the regional variation in these dimensions of transparency, and my findings have important implications for the study of government transparency, executive strength, constitutional design, and democratic accountability and legitimacy. |
