Attitudes of civilian and military leaders toward war initiation: Application of Richard Betts' analysis of American cases to other countries

This dissertation focuses on civil-military relations and the use of force in the initiation of war. Its main purpose is to ascertain whether the research findings of Richard Betts in his analysis of U.S. military intervention cases during 1945-75 are applicable to similar cases of war intervention by other countries. More specifically, this study examines two basic findings of Betts in five case studies of non-American intervention: (1) the extent to which the civilian leadership is more aggressive than the military leadership in advocating the initiation of war; and (2) the extent to which a military recommendation against war initiation is more likely than one for it to be accepted by the top decision makers.;Using structured-focused comparisons, this dissertation examined five cases of war initiation by countries other than the U.S.-Chinese intervention in the Korean War (1950), British intervention in the Suez crisis (1956), Israel's Six-Day War (1967), India's Indo-Pakistan War (1971) and Egypt's Ramadan War (1973).;Betts' first hypothesis about greater civilian aggressiveness held for only two non-American cases, Britain (1956) and India (1971). The second hypothesis that a pro-war recommendation by the military is less likely to be accepted is more generalizable to the non-American cases. The latter was either totally or partially confirmed in all cases but one (China 1950).;We accounted for the differences between Betts' and our findings by using two concepts, military preparedness and the military balance of power between the two countries. The aggressiveness of military leaders depends on military preparedness and is basically consistent in that they are cautious about the use of force. On the other hand, the aggressiveness of civilian leaders is a function of the military balance of power between the countries. Civilian leaders become more aggressive when the balance is in their favor, and hesitant to use force when it is unfavorable. Moreover, the nature and the type of warfare are determined by civilian rather than military leaders when the balance of power is favorable to the potential initiator.