Changes in conventional military doctrines: The cultural roots of doctrinal change

This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom of the determinants of choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. I argue that the preferences that the civilians and the military bring to doctrinal developments cannot be deduced from the structure of the international system or the function of military organization. Instead, I argue that the only way that we can begin to understand changes in doctrine is to examine the constraints set in the domestic political arena and within the military organizations themselves. Indeed, it is the distribution of power at the domestic level, and the military's organizational culture that structures civilian and military preferences.;Civilians are involved in doctrinal developments, but their intervention is not conditioned by, or in response to, the objective situation in the international arena. Instead, the civilians' subjective understanding of the role of military force in the international, and especially, domestic arenas, governs their participation in doctrinal choices. In designing military policy, and in particular, the organizational form of the army, civilians must first answer their concerns about domestic threats and stability.;Just as the interests of the civilians cannot be deduced from the structure of the international system, we cannot derive military preferences from the function of military organizations. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, military organizations do not inherently prefer offensive doctrines. Instead, the organization's culture constrains doctrinal choices within the military.;In short, the interaction between the constraints set in the domestic political arena and the military's organizational culture determines choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Civilians endorse certain military policy options that they view will insure the maintenance of the preferred distribution of power at the domestic level. These civilian choices then severely constrain the military organization's perception of its room to maneuver in adopting its doctrinal orientation. Other militaries would not "see" the same cause and effect relationships, but constrained within an organization with powerful assimilating mechanisms, the officer corps sees no alternative.