U.S. progress reports for the Vietnam War, 1967-1968: A study of the Hamlet Evaluation System and the enemy order of battle

The U.S. war effort in Vietnam from 1965 to 1967 centered on two policies--pacification and the strategy of attrition. U.S. policy-makers and key generals created reporting systems to measure progress of these two policies. The Hamlet Evaluation System and the enemy order of battle figures were the two most prevalent reports used to measure progress. As the war increased in U.S. commitment, casualties, and expenditures, the American people and nations throughout the world increased their voices of dissent against what they deemed was an immoral and senseless war. In response to protest, U.S. policy-makers embarked on a campaign of misinformation, knowingly or not, designed to quell dissent in order to buy time to see if Hanoi would back off from its campaign to unify Vietnam. It is the argument of this study that as political pressures on U.S. policy-makers increased, officially and publicly reported information designed to show progress in the war became increasingly inaccurate.