| The major problem associated with a discussion of scientific discovery is that many philosophers deny that discovery is amenable to philosophical investigation. By addressing the inadequacy of this position, Chapter I reinstitutes the topic of discovery as a legitimate issue for philosophers. Discovery is not an irrational process that can only be subjected to psychological and historical description. Moreover, since logic and rationality are part of both discovery and justification, the discovery/justifiction distinction is unwarranted.;Chapter III establishes the grounds in Aristotle for developing a logic of scientific discovery. The first part of the discussion focusses on the meaning of Aristotelian logic. Since retroduction, the form of inference of discovery, utilizes a dialectical procedure, the logic that applies to dialectical reasoning is the key to defining the logic of scientific discovery. The second part of Chapter III involves the treatment of dialectic in Aristotle's Topics.;Chapter IV introduces a case study of Newton to illustrate that the dialectical method is integral to scientific research.;Throughout, this study delineates the two rational elements of the discovery process that are amenable to logical treatment. First, the type of inference involved in the discovery process follows the pattern of retroduction which has its roots in dialectic and can be compared to the method of analysis in mathematics. Secondly, retroductive inference must be informed by constraints that regulate the choice of hypothesis. Such constraints can be understood in terms of the predicables and strategies Aristotle discusses in the Topics.;The review of the work of Whewell, Peirce, and Hanson in Chapter II highlights discovery as a valid topic for philosophical discussion. In addition, it contributes to the argument that there is a logic of discovery since all three methodologists of science advocate that discovery is a rational process having a logical form.;In conclusion, the logic of scientific discovery can best be defined, not merely as the methodology or rationality or pattern of discovery, but as the dialectic of scientific discovery. |
