Prudence in the statecraft of Edmund Burke

The subject of our inquiry is the conflict between prudence and theory in the political thought of Edmund Burke. Leo Strauss's discussion of Burke's political principles in the final chapter of Natural Right and History has been the proximate cause for our study. It was Strauss's teaching that Burke's denigration of human rationality paved the way for the emergence of the "historical school" or simply "historicism." The provocative nature of such a thesis has induced us to a fresh reconsideration of the problem.; We cannot properly understand the conflict between prudence and theory without knowing what prudence and theory are. There is no better introduction to this problem than Aristotle's discussion in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics. Our own independent investigation of Burke's conception of prudence will examine two of the more critical issues which engaged Burke's considerable energies: the debate over American colonial policies on the eve of the Revolution and the struggle over Parliamentary reform. Following this, we shall illuminate the roots of the conflict between prudence and theory. This effort will make recourse to the moral and epistemological teachings of David Hume. We shall also consider a recent study of Burke's early political work, A Vindication of Natural Society, which sheds new light on Burke's understanding of that conflict. We will conclude with Burke's explanation and defense of the prescriptive nature of the British constitution.; It is our contention that prudence in Burke's statecraft is a function of human sentiment or feeling rather than a specific virtue of human reasoning. It is emancipated from any dependence upon theory because reason has so little influence over the springs of human moral and political behavior. Thus, prudence is fundamentally conditioned in Burke's thought by a profound skepticism about reason's ability to penetrate the thickets generated by human political behavior. Nevertheless, Burke's overt skepticism is balanced by an equally powerful fear of reason's ability to disturb the settled arrangements of political practice. The supreme and comprehensive scrutiny that theory brings to the political things may expose men to truths which could discredit government. Thus, it becomes the task of prudential statecraft in Burke to insulate the political community from the disturbing consequences of such discoveries. The prudence called for in such a view becomes the art of concealing the questionable foundations of political order.