A prevalent view is that the 1965 normalization treaty between Japan and South Korea reflected a coercive American foreign policy intent on turning existing bilateral security treaties into a trilateral regional alliance.;This report is presented in five sections. The historiography section identifies various schools of thought and their methods of presentation. The next two sections explained U. S. policy: its inconsistency, its Northeast Asian commitment, and the concerns and frustrations of its diplomatic personnel working with the Japanese and South Korean negotiation teams. The final section discusses a significant ideological shift in South Korean politics which accompanied Syngman Rhee's overthrow and pushed the normalization question toward its resolution. The report concludes that the United States was caught off guard by the hostility between the Japanese and South Koreans, could not force a settlement without risking its relations with either partner, and had no alternative but to adopt a restrained diplomatic posture and respect the historical interests and present realities of its regional allies. It offered only to organize and open the lines of bilateral communication and clear up issues of misunderstanding. (Abstract shortened by UMI.). |