Freedom of expression and human dignity

Freedom of expression is necessary to protect the free flow of ideas and individual self-fulfillment. However, this freedom must be balanced against the need to remedy the harms it can cause. This thesis is concerned with how to strike the correct balance in the case of hate speech and pornography.;The thesis argues that neither the Millian approach to freedom of expression nor the equality-based approach (in terms of which hate speech and pornography are characterized as forms of discrimination) strikes a satisfactory balance between expressive rights and other human interests. The suggested alternative is that the concept of human dignity be used both to justify freedom of expression and to set suitable limits to it.;Whereas dignity, in the sense of autonomy or privacy, is known to Anglo-American jurisprudence, an actionable right to remedy offences to dignity is not. The actio injuriarum of the Roman-Dutch law of South Africa, however, provides a civil remedy for impairment of dignity. The thesis examines the compatibility of the actio with the values underlying freedom of expression, and concludes that where dignity is impaired by meaningless abuse, liability can be imposed without compromising such values, but that where harm takes the form of derogatory statements of fact, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving the falsity of such statements.;So far as pornography is concerned, it is argued that where material depicts harmful conduct in such a manner as to incite those exposed to it to emulate what is depicted, publication should be characterized as an impairment of the dignity of the individuals or groups against whom the incitement is directed. Where material depicts a combination of sex and violence in such a manner as to incite consumers, publishers should be held civilly liable to such individuals or groups. In accordance with general principles governing incitement, liability would arise whether or not consumers acted upon the incitement, but could be imposed only where it depicted the infliction of non-consensual harm or harm of a type to which the law should not recognize the validity of consent.