| This thesis analyses democratic transition and the Russian domestic security services from the adoption of the new constitution in 1993 to the end of 1997. Each chapter examines important aspects of this process: the attributes that define a democratic security service; other countries! attempts to democratize their services; changes in the Soviet Union's and then Russia's security apparatus in the decade before 1994; the relationship between the Russian executive branch and the security establishment; parliament's interaction with the security services; judicial control over the security apparatus; and internal changes in the agencies themselves. Focusing on the Main Guard Directorate, the Presidential Security Service, the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service/Federal Security Service, this study questions the claims made by Russian government and security officials that these successor agencies to the KGB have become more democratic since the Soviet Union collapsed and new security legislation and a constitution were adopted.;In examining the security services during this transition period, the author found that very little reform has occurred in Russian's domestic security apparatus. President Boris El'tsin, reacting to the political clash with parliament that culminated in October 1993, has consolidated his control over the security services at the expense of legislative oversight and judicial control. As a result, parliament has very little authority over the security services, particularly budget levels and expenditures. The judiciary, mandated by the constitution to protect individual rights, has been handicapped in its ability to carry out its duties due to personnel vacancies and restrictive security laws. As for the security services, they continue to be staffed by an overwhelming number of former KGB officers who retain anti-democratic views toward political liberalization and individual rights. |
