| This thesis examines the impact of hegemonic governance on militarized interstate disputes. First, I develop a theory-based argument to explain how hegemony, a systemic factor, affects interstate conflict. The theory of hegemonic governance stipulates that strong hegemony suppresses interstate militarized conflict in contests where the hegemon---the state with the ability, the will and the acceptance of other states to assume leadership---is sufficiently interested. The hegemon's sphere of interest is so expansive that its combined activities aggregately affect the entire system. Therefore, while hegemonic governance primarily affects dyadic conflict, it also exhibits an overall systemic effect. Second, I construct a comprehensive, multidimensional, interval-level indicator to better measure both hegemonic power and hegemonic interest. The indices of hegemonic power and hegemonic interest span the United Kingdom's hegemony (1816--1945) and the United States' hegemony (1946--1992). Third, I empirically assess the impact of hegemonic governance, first on systemic and then on dyadic indicators of militarized conflict. For both levels of analysis, I assess the frequency, duration, intensity and expansion of conflict. My findings indicate that hegemonic governance pacifies the international system primarily by stabilizing strategically relevant dyads. Hegemonic governance diminishes the frequency, duration, intensity and expansion of militarized conflicts critical to the hegemon. For scientific analyses of conflict, this finding implies that a systemic factor---hegemonic power---constrains dyadic interactions through a third-party process. This thesis suggests that an underutilized variable---hegemony---yet explains world political interactions at an overlooked level of analysis. |
