Gilbert Ryle and phenomenology: A comparison of two non-reductivist approaches to philosophy

The aim of this thesis is twofold. On one level it examines the sense in which Gilbert Ryle's philosophy can be described as 'phenomenological'. Various elements of Ryle's thought are compared to similar ideas found in the works of mainstream phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Similarities are brought out in a discussion of four different topics. The first deals with methodological issues. Ryle's strategy of analysis is compared to that of Husserl. The proper subject matter of philosophy is identified as the general structure of our conceptual scheme and the world as we experience it (i.e. the life world). The second discussion is an examination of the life-world with special reference to meaningful and purposive human behaviour. It is shown that Ryle cannot be classified as a 'reductive behaviourist.' In the third discussion, Ryle's views on the primacy of engaged thinking and knowing-how, along with similar phenomenological doctrines, are shown to raise doubts about the possibility of artificial intelligence. These same views, coupled with Strawson's idea of 'soft naturalism', provide justification for the view that one can avoid the threat of scepticism. This is the topic of the final chapter. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).