| This thesis explicates Alvin Plantinga's “Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism,” which purports to show that the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism with evolutionary theory is self-defeating; and evaluates the argument in light of several scholarly objections that have been raised against it.; Plantinga has already published responses to some of the objections, and these responses are articulated here. However, there are several objections that have not yet been answered in any published work. This thesis provides a detailed response to each of these in a manner that is both original and consistent with Plantinga's most recent formulation of the argument.; The conclusion of this treatment of the argument will demonstrate that the objections have actually served to facilitate a clearer and stronger version of the argument. Through this investigation, we will be able to see the important contribution that the argument makes to the philosophical sub-fields of epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. |
