Kant and Aristotle on practical reason and virtue (Immanuel Kant)

It has been widely assumed in the history of philosophy that the moral theories of Aristotle and Kant are so different that there simply is no common ground on which to compare them. This dissertation seeks to dispel that assumption and prepare the ground for dialogue between Aristotle and Kant. The thesis of this investigation is that if an analysis of each theory is conducted independently, and if that analysis is delineated specifically in terms of practical reason and virtue, then it can be demonstrated that both Aristotle and Kant share a common interest in the primary question of practical reason. Thus it will be argued that both Aristotle and Kant are fundamentally interested in “How ought one live his life as a whole?” Given the latter, it is further claimed that their theories are of a similar shape, (i.e., no extra-ethical foundation to ethics), that both possess a conception of practical reason that is unified but not monistic, and that their respective conceptions of what it is to be a virtuous person are more similar than dissimilar. While the above similarities hold at a general level, it is argued that when the details of their theories of moral education are examined, sharp contrasts emerge.; Although this analysis is both historical and comparative, it treats each theory independently in order to avoid begging the question as to whether they are comparable in the first place. Hence it is not assumed that their respective notions of virtue and practical reason are identical. Points of convergence or divergence must emerge from the texts themselves. Thus historical analysis in this context does not refer to tracking a line of influence between Aristotle and Kant. Rather, historical analysis in this investigation simply refers to getting each theory correct in terms of each philosopher's texts.