The Hylomorphism of John Duns Scotus

Hylomorphism is a metaphysical theory that seeks to posit some entity, form (morphe), whose theoretical role it is to shape or organize matter ( hyle). For two or more objects to be similar in kind is for them to share the same kind of form. For an object to pass out of existence is for its matter to cease to be formed by its form, and for an object to come into existence is for some matter to become newly formed. This dissertation examines several features of John Duns Scotus's version of hylomorphism.;Chapter 1 provides some philosophical background to Scotus's hylomorphism, with a special focus on Scotus's theory of matter. Scotus is committed to prime matter, an actual entity, really distinct from form, persisting through change, whose nature is simply to be a passive power for change. I argue that for Scotus matter's being a passive power does not entail that it persists through change.;Chapter 2 analyzes Scotus's account of how matter and form become parts. Scotus thinks that a form is a part of any object whose form it is, and therefore form cannot be offered as a general explanation of how things become parts. Each of matter and form can exist on its own (if only by divine power) but not compose a substance. Since, in general, changes in relative properties must be explained by changes in absolute (non-relative) properties, for a thing to become a part---to acquire a parthood relation---some absolute change must occur. Scotus argues that the only absolute change that can explain how matter and form acquire parthood relations is the production of a substance. Developing the Aristotelian idea that matter and form exercise certain kinds of causality, Scotus argues that matter and form are the causes of the substance they compose, and identifies the parthood relations of matter and form with their causal relations toward substance.;Chapter 3 is the first philosophical exploration of a little known feature of Scotus's hylomorphism: Scotus held that the extended parts of some material substance, such as the eyes and hands of Socrates, are themselves substances, with their own specific substantial forms. I argue that Scotus thinks that the form of corporeity is nothing over and above the forms of the plurality of extended parts. I develop an alternate account according to which a plurality of substances potentially compose a substance when they are essentially ordered to one another in the order of final- and efficient-causality. I close the chapter with some reflections on Scotus's reasons for denying that the plurality of all the substances compose one world-substance/;Chapter 4 considers Scotus's reasons for denying that the four chemical elements actually exist in the bodies of which they are the basic ingredients. Scotus and most medieval philosophers were agreed that the elements cease to exist when they are mixed. I argue that Scotus's fundamental reason for holding the majority view is that elemental bodies cannot compose a unity of order: they are neither efficient nor final-causally related to one another, since elements act for the sake of reaching their proper sublunary region, and they naturally corrupt elemental bodies of other kinds if they are able. Any combination of elemental bodies therefore lacks the unity requisite for a plurality of substances potentially to compose a complex substance.;The final chapter applies the results of the preceding chapters to show how Scotus would respond to a problem with the application of hylomorphism to living things. First, hylomorphism seems to entail that matter is contingently formed by its form. Second, the principle of homonymy, endorsed by Aristotle and Aquinas, holds that some substance, s, is a member of a kind, K, if and only if it is able to perform the characteristic function or functions of the Ks. By the first thesis, Socrates's corpse is numerically identical with Socrates's body, since Aristotle identifies Socrates's body as the matter of Socrates. By the second thesis, Socrates's corpse is not numerically identical with Socrates's body, since the corpse cannot perform the characteristic functions of a human body. This contradiction has been called "the fundamental problem about hylomorphism." I argue that Scotus's pluralism about substantial forms entails rejection of the homonymy principle, since at least some organic parts, such as hands, eyes, and kidneys, are distinct kinds of substances, which depend on an organism only for their natural operations and not for their existence. Therefore Scotus's hylomorphism solves the fundamental problem. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)...