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Partisan polygons: Geographic compactness and efficient gerrymanders

Posted on:2017-02-08Degree:M.AType:Thesis
University:The University of North Carolina at Chapel HillCandidate:Curiel, John AFull Text:PDF
GTID:2460390014970816Subject:Political science
Abstract/Summary:
Redistricting reformers view geographic district compactness, the drawing of regular polygon shaped districts, as a non-partisan constraint on gerrymandering. I argue that compactness is partisan in effect as it constrains Democratic electoral success, while abetting the GOP. High concentrations of Democratic voters in cities lead to divergent strategies by the parties when they redistrict to maximize their share of congressional seats. Democrats draw non-compact districts so as to extend out their support across the state whereas the GOP uses compact districts to prevent Democratic congressional seat gains. I test this proposition and find that compact districts lead to partisan ratios which enable the Republican Party to capture more districts. Further, Democratic unified governments draw less compact districts on average. At the same time, courts and independent commissions draw more compact districts, due to their belief compact districts constrain gerrymandering. These results call into question compactness as a non-partisan redistricting principle.
Keywords/Search Tags:Compact, Partisan, Districts
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