Oceans of trouble: Cooperation and conflict over fishing resources in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea

What impact do domestic politics have on the terms of international agreements? What role do different groups within state and society play in negotiating international agreements and how does their participation influence the outcome? Using theories predicting how domestic politics influence international cooperation I examine how players such as interest groups, the bureaucracy, and the parliament, constrain the terms of international agreements. The central hypothesis is that a nation with a more constrained domestic bargaining space is more able to force an agreement closer to its preferences.; The research focuses on seven agreements spanning 20 years signed by Norway and Iceland managing common fish stocks that straddle national and international waters. The management of these stocks seeks to solve the classic "tragedy of the commons" created when none of the participants has an incentive to unilaterally establish management procedures to protect a fish stock. The agreements cover the management of four different fish stocks---Arctic cod, Icelandic capelin, Norwegian-Icelandic herring and oceanic redfish---since the creation of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the late 1970s. The terms of the agreements allocate the four stocks among the participants as well as dictate access to national waters to fish the quota. The research shows that the agreements are usually either based on the distribution of each stock (zonal attachment) or on historical fishing rights. Which mechanism the delegations to the negotiations choose as a baseline depends on domestic political considerations of the two nations.; While the research is not conclusive, it does suggest that nations with a narrower bargaining space usually get more favorable agreements. Interest groups are important veto players in domestic and international policy formation in Iceland and Norway. The research shows that while the interest groups' ability to influence policy has remained constant in Iceland during the past 20 years, interest group influence has declined substantially in Norway. The power of the Icelandic interest groups constrains the Icelandic delegations to a greater extent than interest groups do in Norway, giving Iceland a more favorable outcome in practically all the agreements, especially those negotiated in the 1990s.