The role of leadership in international relations theory

Among the claims that Structural neo-Realism makes about international affairs, two are particularly innovative: The first is that systemic structure operates as an independent variable in international politics that explains why states often desire peace and yet go to war. The second is that the system defining principles of anarchy and self-help condition states to emulate the security policies of other states. This process of emulation produces a convergence of material capability that results in the formation of an effective balance of power regardless of whether any actor wishes it to form.; The case of British armament behavior prior to the Second World War confounds structural neo-Realist expectations that states will form balances against other states that present significant material capability coupled with malevolent intentions. While there have been efforts made by structural thinkers to resolve this inconsistency with neo-Realist expectations, those explanations suffer from serious shortcomings.; In answering why Britain failed to balance effectively against Nazi Germany, this thesis argues that effective balances of power are the intentional creation of national leaders.; Effective balances of power are the result of the careful work of national leaders in identifying potential rivals, diagnosing the nature of the threats their nation's face, prescribing appropriate measures to meet those threats by compensating for domestic vulnerabilities while exploiting the vulnerabilities of a rival and finally, in mobilizing their nations for the tasks of meeting those prescriptions.; A balance of power failed to form between Germany and the United Kingdom during the 1930's not because of any systemic structural reason as neo-Realists argue, but because its leaders failed in the tasks of leadership required for the formation of an effective balance of power. Their diagnoses of both their own and Germany's vulnerabilities was inadequate. They also failed to prescribe appropriate measures to reduce their own vulnerability and to exploit Germany's. Finally, they failed because they made only a minimal effort towards mobilizing the British nation for war.