Toward an empirically grounded theory of virtues for consequentialism

Consequentialism—the theory that the right option is the one that maximizes value—is often criticized for the reason that living up to its demands brings with it objectionable alienation from one's personal commitments. In my dissertation, I examine Bernard Williams' 'one thought too many' objection as an example of this alienation criticism. My dissertation works towards a coherent and empirically grounded reply to this criticism on behalf of consequentialism. To this end, I first examine Philip Pettit's reply based on his virtual consequentialism as an example of the standard consequentialist reply. I show that a central assumption of Pettit's theory, the convergence thesis, fails; moreover, the criticism he addresses is a less rich understanding of Williams' criticism compared to the one I propose, the 'endorsement criticism'. I then develop my reply by enriching Peter Railton's sophisticated consequentialism and providing an account of consequentialist virtues. I argue that my reply fares better than Pettit's reply in that it does not assume the convergence thesis, and it engages the endorsement criticism. I then examine the empirical grounding for my reply. In particular, I consider John Doris's situationist challenge to virtue theories as an empirical challenge to my account of consequentialist virtues. I point out several problems with Doris's argument as it is commonly understood. However, I argue that the experimental results Doris cited indeed motivate a worry regarding the plausibility of virtuous traits as appropriate normative ideals, a worry that merits our attention. Briefly, the observed significant and pervasive influence of situations on our cognition and behavior gives rise to the worry that virtues are extremely difficult to develop or maintain. To engage this worry, we need an operational conception of virtues applicable to empirical studies, as well as to attend to the possible psychological mechanisms underlying virtue development and manifestation. I address the recent research on stereotype activation and control as a case study to clarify the limitations we face at this stage and how we may work to provide empirical grounding for virtues.